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A central issue in the growth literature is whether initial conditions matter for income disparity
among nations. If they don't, then countries will converge to a single regime once the structural
features of the economies are controlled for. If they do, then countries will converge to multiple
regimes even if the structural features are controlled for. This dissertation is designed to investigate
whether the world is characterized by a single or multiple regimes.
The rst paper investigates whether the predictions of a particular multiple-regime model due
to Galor and Zeira (1993) are borne out by the data. The baseline analysis is carried out with a
sample of 46 countries (for which data are available) during the period 1970-2000. The analysis
produces results that are consistent with the model. These results are broadly robust to different
model specications, sample periods, and permutations of alternative control variables. We take
these results as evidence in support of the multiple-regime models.
The second paper examines whether the conclusions of another multiple-regime model due
to Kremer and Chen (2002) are borne out by the data. The baseline analysis is also carried out
with a sample of 46 countries during the period 1970-2000. The analysis produces results that
are consistent with the model. These results are broadly robust across different human capital
differential variables, different sample sizes, and additional control variables. We take these
results as evidence in support of the multiple-regime models.
The third paper revisits the convergence hypothesis test using a new stochastic dominance
method. The baseline analysis is carried out with a sample of 100 countries during the period
1960-2000. Together with the robustness check, the analysis yields results that are consistent




Economists have long been concerned about the issue of income disparity among nations. This
concern is based on whether income disparity is expected to be temporary or permanent; see
Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005). If the disparity is expected to be temporary, then the market
system may be left alone to run its course. If the disparity is expected to be permanent, however,
then economic policy may be called upon to intervene. Hence, an important question is whether
income disparity is likely to be temporary or permanent.
The theory of economic growth answers this question by advancing three competing hypotheses
referred to as the absolute, conditional, and club convergence hypotheses; see Galor (1996)
for a lucid discussion of these hypotheses. According to the absolute convergence hypothesis,
regardless of their initial conditions, countries will eventually converge to each other in terms
of per capita income. If this hypothesis is borne out in the real world, then income disparity
is temporary. According to the conditional convergence hypothesis, regardless of their initial
conditions, countries will eventually converge to each other only if they have similar structural
features such as technologies, saving rates, population growth rates. According to the club
convergence hypothesis, depending on their initial conditions, countries might diverge from
each other in the long run even if they have similar structural features. If the hypothesis of
either conditional or club convergence holds in the real world, then income disparity might be
permanent. However, economic policies should be targeted toward structural features in the
former and initial conditions in the latter.
Of the three hypotheses, the rst one is neither predicted by any growth models nor
substantiated by any empirical evidence. Thus, the rst hypothesis can be readily dismissed. Of
the latter two, the former is predicted by the neoclassical model such as the one developed by
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Solow (1956) while the latter is predicted by the so-called multiple-regime models such as the one
developed by Azariadis and Drazen (1990). Of these two models, the bulk of empirical evidence
appears to lend support to the latter (see Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Hansen (2000), among
others). Nevertheless, the regression-based models on which this evidence rests have come under
attack under statistical grounds. This attack has cast doubt on the ndings of the convergence
hypothesis. Despite this attack, some researchers have responded to its empirical support by
developing alternative growth models that are characterized by multiple steady states.
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we test whether the predictions of a
particular multiple-regime model, developed by Galor and Zeira (1993), are supported by the
international data. In Chapter 3, we test whether the predictions of another multiple-regime
model, developed by Kremer and Chen (2002), are supported by the international data. In Chapter
4, we revisit the convergence hypothesis using a novel method called stochastic dominance. In
Chapter 5, we offer some concluding observations.
Chapter 2, Empirical Analysis of the Galor-Zeira Model, investigates whether the theoretical
predictions of the Galor-Zeira model are borne out by the experience of modern economies.
According to this model, the initial distribution of income is the initial condition which determines
whether a given economy converges to a low- or high-income group. This conjecture depends on
the assumption that individuals vary in the amount of wealth inherited from their parents. Those
who inherit a sufcient amount of wealth may invest in education and become skilled workers.
Those who inherit an insufcient amount of wealth have two options: they may borrow to nance
their education and become skilled workers during the second period of their lives or choose not
to acquire education and remain as unskilled workers for the rest of their lives. If they borrow,
they need to repay the debt plus its interest payments. Due to the assumed imperfect credit
markets, banks charge a higher interest rate than the one when credit markets are perfect. This
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higher-than-normal interest rate deters some poor individuals from investing in education (i.e.,
they are credit-constrained).
It follows then that a) there exists a threshold level of wealth below (above) which individuals
choose to become unskilled (skilled) workers, and b) if the population of an economy is
concentrated below (above) this threshold level, then the economy converges to a low-income
(high-income) group. Together, both of these statements suggest that income inequality has an
adverse impact on the long-run income level.
Based on the theoretical predictions of the Galor-Zeira model, we construct an appropriate
specication for a regression model. Since income inequality affects the income level through
human capital investment, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) model in which the level of
income per capita is regressed on human capital investment, where the latter is instrumented by a
measure of income inequality. Following the literature, we adopt a Gini index variable compiled
by Deininger and Squire (1996) as a proxy for income inequality. In the second-stage regression,
we also include other control variables as implied by the Solow (1956) model.
In the baseline estimation, we obtain results that lend support to the Galor-Ziera model. That
is, the coefcient on the income inequality measure is negative and signicant and the coefcient
of human capital investment is positive and signicant. To control for idiosyncratic factors that
might vary across regions, we add dummy variables for Latin American and Asian countries. We
nd that the results in the baseline estimation continue to hold. Therefore, we conclude that our
analysis yields evidence in support of the Galor-Ziera model.
To determine whether these baseline results are robust to alternative model specications,
sample sizes, etc., we proceed with a series of robustness checks. First, we replace the dependent
variable, the level of income per capita, with the growth rate of income per capita. Second,
we replace the stock measure of human capital that we employ with a ow measure of human
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capital. Third, we alter the sample size by curtailing the sample period. Next, we expand the
sample size by utilizing the panel data, and we control for individual country effects by estimating
the xed effects (FE) model, and for measurement error by estimating the between effects (BE)
model. Additional robustness tests are also considered. In most of these exercises, we nd that the
results are broadly consistent with those in the baseline estimation. We take all of these results as
evidence in favor of the Galor-Zeira model.
Chapter 3, Empirical Analysis of the Kremer-Chen Model, investigates whether the theoretical
predictions of the Kremer-Chen model are borne out in the real world. Like the Galor-Zeira
model, this model also conjectures that the initial distribution of income determines whether a
particular economy converges to a low- or high-income group. Unlike the Galor-Zeira model,
this conjecture depends on the assumption that individuals vary in the opportunity cost of rearing
children. For poor (rich) households, the opportunity cost childrearing is low (high); thus, they
end up having many (few) children. In addition to the opportunity cost, childrearing entails direct
costs, one component of which is education. For poor (rich) households, the cost of education
as a fraction of the total cost of childrearing is substantial (immaterial); therefore, they end up
investing less (more) in the education of their children. Hence, poor people end up with many
yet uneducated children while rich households end up with few yet educated children (there is a
trade-off between the quantity and quality of children).
It follows then that a) there exists a threshold level of wealth below (above) which households
invest more in the quantity (quality) of their children, and b) if the population of an economy is
concentrated below (above) this threshold level, then the economy converges to a low-education
(high-education) group. Taken together, both statements imply that income inequality has a
negative impact on the long-run income level.
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We begin by specifying a regression model that is consistent with the theoretical predictions of
the Kremer-Chen model. Since income inequality affects the income level through human capital
differential, we adopt an IV model with the level of income per capita is regressed on human
capital differential, where the latter is instrumented by the Gini index which serves as a proxy for
income inequality. Like Chapter 2, other control variables as implied by the Solow (1956) model
are also included.
It turns out that there are a number of alternative proxies for the human capital differential
variable. Experimenting with all of these proxies, we nd that most results are broadly consistent
with the prediction of the Kremer-Chen model. That is, the coefcient of the Gini index is
negative and signicant and the coefcient of human capital differential is positive and signicant.
As before, we add dummy variables for Latin American and Asian countries to control for
idiosyncratic factors that might vary across regions. The estimation results remain intact even
with the inclusion of these regional dummies. We take all of these results as evidence in support
of the Kremer-Chen model. To limit the scope of our analysis, we choose the best proxy for the
robustness analysis.
As in Chapter 2, we proceed with a series of robustness checks. First, we improve human
capital data by weighting the original data with data on the return to schooling and the duration
of schooling. Second, we expand the sample size by employing the panel data. Next, we conduct
other sensitivity checks such as controlling for individual country effects (by estimating the FE
model) and measurement error (by estimating the BE model). In many cases considered, we nd
that the results are broadly consistent with those in the baseline estimation. We take all of these
results as evidence in favor of the Kremer-Chen model.
Chapter 4, A Reexamination of the Convergence Hypothesis, revisits the convergence
hypothesis using a novel method called stochastic dominance. An advantage of the stochastic
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dominance method over regression-based convergence analysis is that it considers the entire
growth distribution. In brief, this method works as follows: given the growth distribution of, say,
Africa and OECD, then convergence is said to occur if the growth distribution of Africa fails
to stochastically dominate that of OECD and vice versa. If the growth distribution of Africa
stochastically dominates that of OECD or vice versa, then they diverge from each other.
We begin the analysis by utilizing the data on actual growth rates of per capita income for 100
countries during the period 1960-2000. This 100-country sample is then partitioned into four
regional groups: Africa, Latin America, Asia, and OECD countries. Next, we break the sample
period into two: 1961-1980 and 1981-2000. In interregional analysis, we nd the following. First,
convergence occurs between a) Asia and OECD, and b) Latin America and the rest of the world
(ROW) only. Second, the evidence is mixed for Africa and Latin America. Finally, divergence
occurs between any other pairs of regions. In intertemporal analysis, we nd that a) divergence
occurs for Latin America, and b) convergence occurs for each of the remaining regions plus the
world as a whole.
The baseline analysis is carried out without conditioning on the structural features of the
economies. Hence, its results can merely be interpreted in terms of absolute versus club
convergence. Building on the work of Maasoumi, Racine, and Stengos (2006), we repeat the
analysis with the data on residual growth rates of per capita income. Since residual growth rates
are obtained by conditioning actual growth rates on structural features of the economies, the
analysis can now be construed in terms of conditional versus club convergence. In interregional
analysis, we nd evidence of convergence in most cases considered. In intertemporal analysis, we
nd that a) convergence occurs for Africa only, b) the evidence is mixed for Latin America, and c)
divergence occurs for each of the remaining regions plus the entire world. We take these results as
evidence in favor of club convergence.
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Together, these three chapters yield results that are consistent with multiple-regime models. As
mentioned earlier, these models are consistent with the idea of sustained income disparity which
is due to initial conditions. Accordingly, economic policies need to be focused on altering these
initial conditions in order to reverse the trend.
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Chapter 2 Empirical Analysis of the Galor-Zeira Model
2.1 Introduction
The idea that income distribution affects economic growth dates back to at least as early as
Kaldor (1957). According to Kaldor, income inequality is good for growth because concentrated
wealth in the hands of a few permits greater savings, which are conducive for investment. Since
the prediction of this model is often at odds with empirical evidence, this view has recently
been challenged by a handful of economists. In the 1990s, at least three alternative theoretical
models were developed to explain this phenomenon. According to the rst model, known as
the political-economy model, income inequality is bad for growth because average citizens
would push the government for more extensive redistributive policies, which are detrimental for
investment and growth. According to the second model, known as the sociopolitical instability
model, income inequality is bad for growth because it might create social tension which is harmful
for investment. According to the third model, known as the credit constraint model, income
inequality is bad for growth because it restricts the number of people who have access to costly
education. (An extensive overview of the three models is offered by Benabou (1996).)
The political-economy model was developed and tested by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and
Persson and Tabellini (1994). They found evidence consistent with their theoretical prediction:
income inequality has a negative impact on economic growth. Their empirical analysis was
followed by George Clarke (1995) who used alternative measures of income inequality. He
showed that the basic result of a negative inequality-growth relationship is robust across alternative
measures of income inequality. Next, Alesina and Perotti (1996) conducted an empirical analysis
of the sociopolitical instability model. They found evidence in support of the model: income
inequality tends to raise social instability which, in turn, adversely affects investment and growth.
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Then, Roberto Perotti (1996) tested all of the inequality-growth models using a carefully specied
reduced-form model and a variety of structural models. He concluded that the result is robust in
a reduced-form model but mixed in structural models. However, the test of the credit constraint
model is supported by the data.
Next, Deininger and Squire (1998) revisited the analysis with an improved measure of income
inequality that they carefully compiled earlier (Deininger and Squire (1996)). They found that
the basic result is not robust with their improved inequality data. Then, Li and Zou (1998)
generalized the Alesina-Rodrik specication to a panel data of countries. They found that the basic
negative inequality-growth result is overturned. That is, income inequality has a positive impact
on economic growth. This reversed result was also found by Forbes (2000), who generalized
Perotti's reduced-form specication to the panel data. However, this new result collapsed in Barro
(2000), who deviated from the practice of adopting a parsimonious specication by including the
inequality data that Deininger and Squire (1996) regard as low quality. In this instance, Barro
showed that income inequality has no effect on growth. Finally, Sylwester (2000) restored the
basic result when he tested the inequality-education-growth link with cross-country data.
A review of these empirical studies reveals that most of them are based on reduced-form
models of the inequality-growth relationship. The problem with this approach is that any empirical
evidence obtained cannot be directly attributed to any one of the structural models. In some
cases, researchers try to patch up this deciency by testing a structural model as well. However,
most researchers do so for the political-economy model, one study is exclusively concerned with
the sociopolitical instability model (Alesina and Perotti, 1996), one is devoted to an unspecied
model which is similar to the credit constraint model (Sylwester, 2000), and one briey tests the
credit constraint model (Perotti, 1996).
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The credit constraint model was developed by Galor and Zeira (1993). Since its introduction,
this model has occupied a central place in the growth literature due to its theoretical implications
on the phenomenon of persistent income inequality. Some economists argue that this phenomenon
is due to structural features of the economy. If this is the case, then different economies will
converge to a single regime once these structural features are controlled for. Other economists
claim that this phenomenon is due to initial conditions of the economy. If so, then different
economies will converge to multiple regimes even if these structural features are held constant.
The model developed by Galor and Zeira (1993) contributes to this single- vs. multiple-regime
debate by demonstrating that a particular initial condition (the initial distribution of income),
determines whether an economy will converge to a low- or high-income regime. Accordingly,
an empirical test of this model may shed some light on this debate. Despite its prominent role
in the literature, the Galor-Zeira model has not been comprehensively tested. Therefore, this
paper attempts to ll this gap. In particular, we conduct a cross-country empirical analysis for 46
countries during the 1970-2000 period based on the structural model of the inequality-education-
growth relationship developed by Galor and Zeira (1993). In the baseline analysis, we nd that
income inequality has a negative impact on human capital investment, which in turn has a positive
impact on the long-run per capita income. This result is quite robust across different model
specications, estimation methods, and various permutations of variables. We interpret these
results as evidence in favor of the Galor-Zeira model.
We begin our analysis in Section 2.2 by discussing the model developed by Galor and Zeira
(1993), with particular attention to their testable implications. In Section 2.3, we specify our
empirical model and then discuss the data used in this paper. In Section 2.4, we report the results
of our basic and robustness analyses. In Section 2.5, we discuss and interpret our main results. In
Section 2.6, we highlight the major ndings of this paper and conclude.
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2.2 The Galor-Zeira Model
Galor and Zeira (1993) introduce an overlapping-generation model of the economy with
altruism. Here we merely provide a sketch of the model. An economy consists of individuals
who live for two periods. During the rst period, they may choose to work or invest in human
capital; during the second period, they simply work. If they invested in human capital during the
rst period, they would work as skilled workers in the second period and receive high wages;
otherwise, they would work as unskilled workers in both periods and receive low wages. The
work-study decision in the rst period depends partly on the amount of wealth they inherit
from their parents. Assuming that this inheritance varies from one person to another, then those
with greater inheritance stand a better chance of acquiring education. If one's inheritance is not
sufcient, then one can still invest in human capital by borrowing. However, due to assumed
imperfect credit markets, some individuals are credit-constrained. That is, there are individuals
who cannot afford to acquire education because their inheritance falls short of a certain minimum
amount, and they are denied educational loans. To formalize the model, let the utility function of
the representative individual be expressed as
V =  log c+ (1  ) log b;  2 (0; 1); (2.1)
where V is the level of utility, c is the amount of consumption of the individual, b is the amount
of the bequest the individual makes to his children,  is the elasticity of utility with respect to
consumption, and (1   ) is the elasticity of utility with respect to bequest. (Since bequest, b,
is made in the second period, Eq.(2.1) refers to the utility function for the second period.) The
argument b that enters the utility function suggests that individuals derive some amount of utility
from sharing their wealth with their offspring. This bequest then becomes an inheritance of their
children.
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Let x denote the amount of individual inheritance, which varies across individuals. Let h
denote the xed amount of human capital investment needed for individuals to become skilled
workers. Regardless of the relative magnitude of x and h, individuals may or may not choose to
invest in education. If they choose not to invest in education, then they will become unskilled
workers during both periods of their lives, and receive the wage rate of wu. In addition, they may
lend money to others, at the rate of r. As such, their budget constraint for the second period is
c = (x+ wu)(1 + r) + wu   b: (2.2)
If they choose to invest in education, then they will become skilled workers during the second
period, and receive the wage rate of ws. However, the funding for the education expenditures
depends on the relative size of x and h: a) if x < h, then the expenses will be funded through
borrowing, at the rate of i, b) if x  h, then the expenses will be funded through inheritance. As
such, the respective budget constraints for the second period are
c = (x  h)(1 + i) + ws   b; (2.3)
c = (x  h)(1 + r) + ws   b: (2.4)
If we maximize Eq.(2.1) with respect to b subject to the appropriate budget constraint, we will
obtain the optimal bequest for various individuals. With some plausible assumptions and algebra,
Galor and Zeira (1993) show that the optimal amount of inheritance is given by a rst-order
nonlinear difference equation in (xt+1; xt) space:
xt+1 = (1  )
8<: [(xt + wu)(1 + r) + wu] if xt < f[(xt   h)(1 + i) + ws] if f  xt < h[(xt   h)(1 + r) + ws] if xt > h
9=; ; (2.5)
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where xt+1 is the amount of inheritance at time t + 1, xt is the amount of inheritance at time
t, and the remaining variables and parameters are as dened before (see Appendix A for the
derivation of Eq.(2.5)).
Eq.(2.5) can be alternatively represented by a curve with two kinks as depicted in Figure 2.1.
The gure shows that individuals are divided into three groups: those with inheritance less than
f , those with inheritance between f and h, and those with inheritance more than h. Individuals
whose inheritance is less than f are those who work during both periods of their lives as unskilled
workers. Individuals whose inheritance is between f and h are those who acquire education
during the rst period through borrowings and work during the second period as skilled workers.
Individuals whose inheritance is more than h are those who acquire education during the rst
period through inheritance and work during the second period as skilled workers.
Even though there are three groups of individuals to begin with, it turns out that the population
is nally partitioned into two groups separated by point g, an unstable equilibrium point. That
is, those individuals who receive inheritance less than g will end up in the poor group, xpoor, and
those who receive inheritance more than g will end up in the rich group, xrich, in the long-run.
The reason for this dynamic evolution is that a minimum amount of inheritance is needed before
subsequent generations can provide enough bequests for their offspring as well.
It can be inferred from Figure 2.1 that the long-run levels of income are positively related to
the initial number of individuals who inherit more than g. To illustrate, consider an economy
characterized by three different scenarios. First, one-half of the population is concentrated around
f and the remaining one-half around h. Second, one-third of the population is concentrated
around f and the remaining two-third around h. Third, two-third of the population is concentrated
around f and the remaining one-third around h. In all cases, the fraction of population that lives
around f will move to xpoor and the fraction of population that lives around h will move to xrich.
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0 xpoor f           g       h xrich xt
xt+1 45° line
xt+1
Figure 2.1: The Dynamics of Galor-Zeira Model
With reasonable values of income at xpoor; f; g; h; and xrich (say, 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90,
respectively), we can deduce the following: income tends to remain unchanged in the rst
scenario, income tends to rise in the second scenario, and income tends to fall in the third scenario.
Thus, the larger the fraction of people who inherit more than g, the higher the long-run income
tends to be. If we let g be the threshold that separates a poor from a non-poor economy, then we
obtain the following conclusions: 1) An initially poor economy will end up poor in the long run,
2) An initially non-poor economy with wealth distributed among many will end up rich, and 3)
An initially non-poor economy with wealth distributed among few will end up poor.
2.3 Model Specication and Data
We begin by specifying our model based on the description of the Galor-Zeira model. Next, we
compare our specication with the related ones employed in the literature. Finally, we describe
the data used in this paper based on our model specication.
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2.3.1 Model Specication
The above conclusions constitute a testable implication of the Galor-Zeira model. That is,
an initially non-poor country has a better chance to enrich itself in the future if its income
is more equally distributed among its citizens. Thus, a priori we would expect that higher
income inequality will have a negative impact on a country's income in the long-run. Since
this implication is not applicable to an initially poor country, we can control for this effect by
introducing a dummy variable for poor countries. Since income inequality affects future income
through education, we estimate a structural model which consists of two equations. In the rst
equation, income is a function of education and other explanatory variables in the Solow growth
regression. In the second equation, education is a function of income inequality and a dummy
variable for poor countries. In particular, we estimate the following structural model:
Income = 1 + 2:Educ+ 3:Invest + 4:(n+ g + ) + u; (2.6)
Educ = 1 + 2:Gini+ 3:Poor + v; (2.7)
where Income is the level of long-run income per capita, Educ is the amount of human capital
investment, Invest is the amount of physical capital investment, (n+ g + ) is the sum of the rates
of population growth, technological progress, and capital depreciation, Gini is the Gini index
which measures the degree of inequality, Poor is a dummy variable equal to 1 for an initially poor
country and 0 otherwise, and u and v are the error terms. A priori, we expect the coefcients of
Gini, Poor, and (n+ g + ) to be negative and those of Educ and Invest to be positive.
2.3.2 Related Model Specications
At this point, we may compare our structural specication with two closely related ones,
namely, those of Perotti (1996) and Sylwester (2000). Perotti (1996) employs the following
structural model:
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Growth = 1 + 2:Educow+ x0 + u; (2.8)
Educow = 1 + 2:Mid + 3:Educstockf + 4:Educstockm+ v; (2.9)
where Growth is the growth rate of per capita income for the period 1960-1985, Educow is
the ow of human capital, x is a vector of control variables (which includes initial income per
capita and PPP investment deator), Mid is the income share of the third and fourth quintiles of
population which measures income equality (as opposed to income inequality), Educstockf is the
stock of female human capital, and Educstockm is the stock of male human capital.
There are a few notable differences between Perotti's and our structural model. First, Perotti's
dependent variable in the rst equation is Growth while ours is Income. We use Income because
that is what is implied by the Galor-Zeira model; Perotti uses Growth because that is a standard
practice in the growth empirics. This should not be a problem, however, because we can always
transform our level regression into the growth regression. Second, Perotti discriminates between
two measures of human capitalstock and owand he treats the ow measure as endogenous
and the stock measure as exogenous. Third, Perotti includes a PPP investment deator in order to
account for market distortion. However, this variable is not an important determinant of growth.
Finally, Perotti does not include Invest and Poor. The omission of the former follows from his
reduced-form model which tries to accommodate other theoretical models. Nevertheless, this
variable is an important determinant of growth. The exclusion of Poor is unfortunate since this is
implied by the Galor-Ziera model.
Sylwester (2000) employs the following structural model:
Growth = 1 + 2:Educ$+ x0 + u; (2.10)
Educ$ = 1 + 2:Gini+ 3:Democracy+ 4:Pop+ v; (2.11)
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where Educ$ is the amount of educational expenditures, x is a vector of control variables
(which includes the lagged value of Educ$, the stock of human capital, and initial income per
capita), Democracy is a dummy variable equal to one for a democratic country and zero otherwise,
and Pop is the growth rate of population; other variables are as dened before.
To begin with, Sylwester does not base his specication on a theoretical model. His main
concern is to determine whether income inequality affects growth through education. It turns out
that his specication is consistent with the credit constraint model. There are several differences,
though. First, Sylwester uses a distinctive measure of human capital, educational expenditures.
This measure can be thought of as another proxy for the ow of human capital. Second, he
employs both the stock and ow of human capital in Eq. (2.10). Third, he also includes the lagged
value of educational expenditures in both of his equations. Finally, he adds Democracy, a variable
which is implied by the political-economy model but not by the Galor-Zeira model.
2.3.3 Basic Data
On the basis of the preceding discussion, we believe that our specications in Eqs. (2.6) and
(2.7) are appropriate. We proceed by collecting the cross-country data for all of the variables
identied in those equations from various sources. It turns out that the Gini data imposes
substantial restrictions on the number of available observations. If we wish to use this data
for as early as 1960, then we end up with as few as 14 observations. The number of available
observations rises as we adjust the beginning period upward: 27 if we begin from 1965, 41 if
1970, 52 if 1975, and 62 if 1980.
To have as many observations as possible while having data for a relatively long period of time,
we relax the time classication for the inequality data. That is, data that ranges between 1960 and
1965 is treated as the 1960 data, data that ranges between 1970 and 1975 is treated as the 1970
data, and data that ranges between 1980 and 1985 is treated as the 1980 data. With this slight
relaxation of classication, we have the following: 75 observations if we begin from 1980, 56 if
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1970, 29 if 1960, etc. We settle for data that begins from 1970; hence, we have 56 observations.
When we match these data with the data on other variables, we lose another 10 observations.
Thus, we end up with 46 observations.
Given this restriction, we collect the necessary data for 46 countries during the period
1970-2000. Based on Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7), we need data for the following six variables:
 Inc2000: This variable is dened as the log of the real GDP per capita in 2000 and is taken
from the Penn World Table version 6.1 (PWT6.1).
 Invest: This variable is dened as the log of the annual average of the ratio of real investment
to GDP during the period 1970-2000. This variable is taken from PWT6.1.
 (n + g + ): This variable is dened as the log of the sum of the rates of population growth
(n), technological progress (g), and capital depreciation (). The population growth rate data
(n), taken from PWT6.1, is dened as the annual average of the population growth rate during
1970-2000. We follow the literature by setting g +  = 0:05.
 Educ: This variable is dened as the log of average years of schooling for population over 25
years old during the period 1970-2000.1;2 This measure is taken from Barro and Lee (2001).
 Gini: This variable, which measures the degree of income inequality, is dened as the log of
the Gini index in 1970 or its closest neighboring period but cannot exceed 1975. Gini is taken
from Deininger and Squire (1996), who make the necessary efforts to compile high-quality
income distribution data. In particular, they impose three stringent quality criteria before the
data can be accepted. First, data must be based on household surveys (not from national
accounts that make some assumptions about patterns of income inequality). Second, data
must be based on comprehensive coverage of population (not based on some segments of
population only). Third, data must be based on comprehensive coverage of income sources
(not based on wage incomes only but also nonwage incomes).3
 Poor: This variable is dened as a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for any countries that
are classied by the World Bank as low-income countries in 1970 (and 0 otherwise) based on
their income range. Since the data for 1970 is not available, we use the data for 1972. This
data is taken the World Tables 1976, published by the World Bank.
1 We could have dened Educ as the log of annual average of the educational attainment for population over 15 years
old. However, this measure of educational attainment may potentially create bias since part of the population, ages
1524, do not have a chance to complete tertiary education.
2 It has been suggested that the education variable be measured in 2000 (i.e., Educ2000) instead of as the average of
1970-2000. However, doing so makes us prone to simultaneity bias between Educ2000 and Inc2000.
3 It has been suggested that we consider another source of Gini data from Texas income inequality data.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
Using cross-country data for 46 countries during the period 1970-2000, we conduct an
empirical analysis of the Galor-Zeira model based on Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7). In particular, we
estimate Eq. (2.6) by the instrumental variable (IV) method, where Educ is instrumented by Gini
and Poor. Hence, Eq. (2.7) corresponds to the rst-stage regression and Eq.(2.6) the second-stage
regression.4
2.4.1 Basic Analysis
We begin by running the rst-stage regression corresponding to Eq. (2.7) and present the
estimation results in Table 2.1. Column (1b) shows that the coefcients of Gini and Poor are
individually signicant at the 1% level. Since both coefcients are also jointly signicant at
the 5% level, we proceed with the second-stage regression and present the results in Column
(1a). (In any analysis, the second-stage regression is conducted only if Gini and Poor are jointly
signicant.) We observe that the coefcient of Educ enters with the expected sign and signicant
at the 1% level of signicance. While the coefcient of Invest is of the anticipated sign, it is
insignicant. Finally, the coefcient of (n+ g+ ) enters with the wrong sign and is insignicant.
Since the coefcients of key variablesGini, Poor, and Educenter with the correct signs and
signicant, we take these results as evidence in favor of the Galor-Zeira model.
The empirical literature on the inequality-growth relationship usually adds three regional
dummy variablesthe Latin American countries, the Asian countries, and the African countries
in order to control for institutional and cultural factors that might differ across regions. Since there
are only two African countries in our 46-country sample, we add two regional dummies only,
Latin and Asia, to our second-stage regression.5 In the rst-stage regression, Column (2b), we
4 Since Invest and (n + g + ) are assumed to be exogenous, their coefcients will enter the rst-stage regression
as well to ensure that Educ is estimated with the optimal set of instruments; see Chapter 5 of Wooldridge (2002).
However, these exogenous variables have little meaning in the rst-stage regression. Hence, their coefcients will be
suppressed from the rst-stage regression results.
5 Like Invest and (n + g + ), these regional dummies are assumed to be exogenous. Hence, they will enter the
rst-stage regression too. However, since they have little meaning there, their estimates will be suppressed.
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see that the coefcients of Gini and Poor continue to be signicant and their magnitudes remain
robust.6 In the second-stage regression, Column (2a), we observe that the coefcients of regional
dummies are signicant, the coefcient of Educ continues to be signicant and its magnitude
remains robust, and the coefcient of (n+ g + ) continues to be insignicant and enters with the
wrong sign. However, the coefcient of Invest becomes signicant now.
Table 2.1: Preliminary Estimation
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ


































Latin      0:591
( 2:95)
  
Asia      0:370
( 1:75)
  
Adj.R2 0:68 0:63 0:75 0:63
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
We repeat our preliminary estimation without African countries. As shown in Table 2.2, the
coefcients of Gini, Poor, Educ, and Invest enter with the correct signs and signicant in both
basic and augmented specications. However, the coefcient of (n + g + ) enters with the
wrong sign and insignicant in both specications. Finally, the coefcients of regional dummies
enter with the negative signs (but only the coefcient of Latin is signicant). Compared to the
corresponding coefcients in Table 2.1, these results are qualitatively similar with one major
6 The magnitude of a coefcient is said to be robust if it differs from the corresponding coefcient in the basic
specication within one standard deviation. In our sample, one standard deviation of Gini, Poor, Educ, Invest,
(n+ g + ), Latin, and Asia is 0:25, 0:31, 0:51, 0:52, 0:14, 0:46, and 0:47, respectively.
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exception: the coefcient of Invest becomes signicant in both specications. This result suggests
that the presence of African countries drives the previous results. Therefore, we will include a
dummy variable for African countries, Africa, in each basic specication in subsequent exercises.
Table 2.2: Preliminary Estimation without African Countries
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ


































Latin      0:504
( 2:22)
  
Asia      0:268
( 1:09)
 
Adj.R2 0:63 0:57 0:69 0:55
Obs. 44 44 44 44
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 2.3 shows the results of our baseline estimation. In Column (1b), we see that the
coefcients of Gini and Poor enter with the expected signs and signicant. In Column (1a), we see
that the coefcients of Educ and Invest enter with the correct signs and signicant, the coefcient
of (n + g + ) enters with the incorrect sign and insignicant, and the coefient of Africa enters
with the positive sign and signicant. This last result mirrors the previous nding that African
countries matter. We proceed by including all regional dummies and report the results in Columns
(2a) and (2b). The coefcients of Gini, Poor, Educ, and Invest enter with the correct signs and
signicant, and their magnitudes are robust to those in the basic specication. However, the
coefcient of Africa becomes insignicant due to the presence of other regional dummies. Since
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the coefcients of key variables remain intact, we conclude that these ndings lend support to the
Galor-Zeira model.
Table 2.3: Baseline Estimation
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ







































Latin      0:485
( 2:10)
  
Asia      0:251
(1:00)
 
Adj.R2 0:68 0:68 0:72 0:67
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
2.4.2 Robustness Analysis
Previous work in this area has employed a different measure of income inequality such as
income share or a Gini index from other sources than Deininger and Squire (1996). To cite a few
examples, Persson and Tabellini (1994) use the income share data taken from Paukert (1973),
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) utilize the Gini data from Fields (1989), and Perotti (1996) employs the
income share data from Lecaillon et al. (1984). Therefore, it could be argued that our benchmark
results in Table 2.1 are driven by either a specic source or measure of income inequality that we
employ.
As far the specic data source is concerned, we could argue that data taken from other sources
are of inferior quality because they do not meet the quality standard imposed by Deininger
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and Squire (1996). As far as the specic measure of income inequality data is concerned, we
entertain this objection by replacing our measure of inequality, the Gini index, with the income
share measure. Following Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996), we utilize data on the
income share of the third quintile of population, Mid. However, we take this data from Deininger
and Squire. Furthermore, unlike Gini, Mid is a measure of income equality: hence, we expect the
coefcient of Mid to be positive in the rst-stage regression.
With this change, we repeat our estimation and report the results in Table 2.4. (Note that the
number of observations has reduced to 39 with this alternative measure of income inequality.)
In Columns (1a) and (1b), we observe that the coefcients of Mid, Poor, and Educ enter with
the anticipated signs and signicant. It is interesting to note that the coefcients of Invest and
(n + g + ) enter with the correct signs too although they remain insignicant. In Columns (2a)
and (2b), where regional dummies are included, we see that the coefcients of Mid, Poor, Educ,
and Invest continue to be of the correct signs and signicant (except for Invest). However, the
coefcient of (n+ g+ ) enters with the wrong sign now although it continues to be insignicant.
As before, the presence of other regional dummies renders the coefcient of Africa insignicant.
Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Columns (1a) and (1b), these coefcients are fairly
robust except for Mid. Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table 2.3 (excluding Mid),
we see that there is a fairly huge change in a) the signicance of Invest and Latin in Column (2a),
b) the sign of (n + g + ) in Column (1a), and c) the magnitude of (n + g + ) in Column
(2a). However, there is little change in the coefcients of interest. Therefore, we take these results
as evidence in favor of the Galor-Zeira model.
Previous empirical studies usually employ the growth rate of per capita income as the
dependent variable. When this is the case, it is instructive to add a measure of initial income per
capita, Inc70 in our case, as another explanatory variable. Hence, it could be argued that our
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results are driven by these two differences. To accommodate this argument, we reestimate our
model in the growth regression form. Note, however, that Poor is highly correlated with Inc70,
with a simple correlation coefcient of 0.76. This is hardly surprising since the dummy variable
Poor is derived from the continuous variable Inc70. In order to avoid the problem of omitted
variable bias, however, we include both of them anyway.
Table 2.4: Estimation with Mid in Lieu of Gini
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ







































Latin      0:386
( 1:63)
 
Asia      0:316
( 1:29)
 
Adj.R2 0:74 0:72 0:76 0:72
Obs. 39 39 39 39
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
With these modications, we repeat our estimation and document the results in Table 2.5.
Columns (1a) and (1b) show that the coefcients of Gini, Poor, Educ, and Invest enter with the
expected signs and signicant. It is interesting to note that the coefcient of Inc70 is of the
correct negative sign and signicant; this last result is usually taken as evidence of conditional
convergence. Compared to the corresponding coefcients in the baseline estimation (Table
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2.3), we observe a fairly appreciable change in the magnitude of Poor in Column (1b), and the
signicance of Africa in Column (1a).
Table 2.5: Estimation with Growth in Lieu of Inc2000
Dep.Variable Growth Educ Growth Educ












































Latin      0:304
( 1:36)
 
Asia     0:095
(0:32)
 
Adj.R2 0:14 0:74 0:35 0:75
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
As before, we add regional dummies to the basic specication. In the second-stage regression,
Column (2a), the coefcient of Latin is negative but insignicant, the coefcients of Asia and
Africa are positive yet insignicant, and the coefcients of other variables remain fairly robust
to the corresponding coefcients in Column (1a). In the rst-stage regression, Column (2b), the
coefcients of Gini and Poor remain robust with respect to their counterparts in Column (1b).
Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table 2.3, we see that there is a fairly huge change
in the magnitude of Poor and (n + g + ) Columns (2b) and (2a), respectively. Note that the
coefcient of Latin has become insignicant and the sign of Asia has reversed. Nevertheless, since
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changes in the dependent and explanatory variables do not alter our central results, we interpret
these ndings as further evidence in favor of the Galor-Zeira model.
Perotti (1996) argues that, in the credit imperfection model such as Galor and Zeira (1993), the
human capital variable should be measured in terms of a ow rather than a stock because that is
what is implied by the model. It follows then that the average-years-of-schooling variable that we
have employed up to this point should be replaced by the school-enrollment-ratio variable. By
denition, however, the ow and stock of human capital should be correlated with each other.
This means that if income inequality affects the ow of human capital, then it should also affect
the stock of human capital as well. In fact, for the sample period of 1970-2000 that we utilize, we
nd that the correlation between them is 0.87.
To verify our claim, we substitute the school enrollment ratio, Educf, for the average years
of schooling, Educ, that we employed earlier. Educf is taken from Bernanke and Gurkaynak
(2001) and is dened as the average secondary school enrollment ratio for the period 1970-1995.
As in MRW (1992), the secondary school enrolment is dened as the product of the fraction of
secondary-school-age population in school and the fraction of working-age-population that is of
secondary school age. Even though Educf is available for more than 90 countries, the number of
observations is reduced to 41 when this variable is matched with the Gini variable.
With this slight change, we repeat our estimation and report the results in Table 2.6. In
Columns (1a) and (1b), we observe that the coefcients of Poor and Educf enter with the correct
signs and signicant. While the coefcients of Gini, Invest, and (n + g + ) enter with the
expected signs, they are insignicant. Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table 2.3, we
see that there is a substantial change in a) the signicance of Gini and Invest in Columns (1b) and
(1a), respectively, b) the magnitude and sign of (n+ g + ) in Column (1a), and c) the magnitude
and signicance of Africa in Column (1a).
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When we add regional dummies to the second-stage regression in Column (2a), their
coefcients are insignicant except for Latin, and the coefcient of (n + g + ) changes its sign.
However, the coefcients of Educf and Invest remain robust. In the rst-stage regression, Column
(2b), the coefcients of Gini and Poor remain robust with respect to their counterparts in Column
(1b). Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table 2.3, we nd that there is a huge change
in a) the magnitude and signicance of Gini in Column (2b), b) the signicance of Invest in
Column (2a), and c) the magnitude of Educf, (n+ g + ), and Africa in Column (2a). Since Gini
is insignicant in both specications, we take these ndings as evidence against the Galor-Zeira
model.
Table 2.6: Estimation with Educf in Lieu of Educ
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educf Inc2000 Educf







































Latin      0:770
( 1:90)
  
Asia      0:440
( 1:14)
 
Adj.R2 0:46 0:52 0:47 0:50
Obs. 41 41 41 41
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
One may argue that our benchmark results are subject to sample selection bias since they
are based on a sample of 46 countries only. After all, there is a severe under representation of
African countries (only two countries are included). As discussed before, this problem is due to
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the unavailability of the Gini data across a large sample of countries. Barro (2000) gets around
this problem by including some Gini data dubbed as low quality by Deininger and Squire (1996)
at the risk of exacerbating measurement error. In particular, he adds the Gini data with dubious
documentation as long as the data meet the three criteria set by Deininger and Squire. In contrast,
Deininger and Squire lter out these dubious data before applying the three criteria.
As a compromise between sample selection bias and measurement error, we curtail the sample
period to 19802000 and end up with 61 countries. We replicate our benchmark estimation in
Table 2.3 with this new sample and present the results in Table 2.7. In Columns (1a) and (1b), we
see that the coefcients of Poor80, Educ, and Invest enter with the expected signs and signicant.
Although the coefcients of Gini80 and (n+ g+ ) have the expected signs, they are insignicant.
Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table 2.3, we nd that there is a noticeable change
in a) the magnitude and signicance of Gini and Africa in Columns (1b) and (1a), respectively,
and b) the magnitude and sign of (n+ g + ) in Column (1a).
When we add regional dummies to the second-stage regression in Column (2a), their
coefcients are negative (except for Africa) and insignicant while the coefcients of other
variables remain robust with respect to their counterparts in Column (1a). In the rst-stage
regression, Column (2b), the coefcients of Gini80 and Poor80 remain robust with respect to the
corresponding coefcients in Column (1b). Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table
2.3, we nd that there is an appreciable change in a) the magnitude and signicance of Gini in
Column (2b), b) the signicance of Invest and Latin in Column (2a), and c) the magnitude and
sign of (n + g + ) in Column (2a). We take the insignicance of Gini80 as evidence against the
Galor-Zeira model.
One may justiably argue that these different results might be driven by a different sample
size (46 versus 61) rather than a different sample period. To control for this effect, we repeat
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our estimation in Table 2.7 by reducing the sample size to 46. It turns out that controlling for
the sample size does change the results materially (see Table B1 in Appendix B). First, the
coefcient of Gini80 becomes signicant in Columns (1b) and (2b). Second, the coefcient of
Invest becomes signicant in Columns (1a) and (2a). Third, the magnitude of (n+ g + ) falls in
Column (1a) and its sign changes in Column (2a). We conclude that differences in the magnitude
and signicance of coefcients in Tables 2.3 and 2.7 are driven by the difference in sample size.
Table 2.7: Estimation with 1980-2000 Sample
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ






































Latin      0:111
( 0:50)
 
Asia      0:155
( 0:58)
 
Adj.R2 0:73 0:69 0:74 0:68
Obs. 61 61 61 61
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Hitherto the results seem to indicate that a larger sample size in our baseline estimation is
unfavorable to the Galor-Zeira model. To pursue this line of thought further, we expand the sample
size substantially by replacing our cross-section data with panel data. Following the literature, we
utilize the ve-year interval panel data, where Gini and Poor are measured at 1970, 1975, ..., 1995,
Invest and (n + g + ) are measured as averages of 1971-1975, 1976-1980, ..., 1996-2000, and
Income and Educ are measured at 1975, 1980, ..., 2000. Including only those data for which there
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are at least two consecutive observations, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 53 countries and
226 observations.
With this expanded sample size, we reestimate our model by the pooled IV method. As before,
we start with the rst-stage regression without Latin and Asia. As shown in Column (1b) of Table
2.8(a), the coefcients of Gini and Poor enter with the correct signs and are signicant. Since
they are jointly signicant, we proceed with the second-stage regression. In Column (1a), we see
that the coefcients of Educ and Invest enter with the correct signs and signicant. However, the
coefcient of (n + g + ) enters with the wrong sign and is insignicant. As before, we compare
these coefcients to their counterparts in Table 2.3. Except for changes in the magnitude of Poor
and (n+ g + ), the estimates are fairly robust.
Table 2.8(a): Estimation with Panel Data
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ







































Latin      0:186
( 1:61)
 
Asia      0:499
( 4:25)
  
Adj.R2 0:59 0:56 0:75 0:56
Obs. 226 226 226 226
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Now we proceed with the rst-stage regression with regional dummies. As shown in Column
(2b), the results on Gini and Poor are highly similar to those in Column (1b). In the second-stage
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regression in Column (2a), the coefcients of Educ and Invest continue to be signicant, enter
with the correct signs, and the change in their magnitudes is within one standard deviation.
Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table 2.3, we see that there is a signicant change
in a) the magnitude of Gini, Poor, and (n+ g+ ), and b) the signicance of all regional dummies.
Once again, the difference in our results are driven by the difference in sample size. As a matter
of fact, since the results in the baseline estimation appear to be restored, we reject the idea that a
larger sample size is unfavorable to the Galor-Zeira model. In this case, since the results on key
variables remain intact, we take these ndings as further support for the Galor-Zeira model.
Kristin Forbes (2000) argues that the negative impact of income inequality on growth could
be attributed to omitted variable bias due to factors that are not adequately captured by regional
dummy variables. To overcome this deciency, she estimates the growth regression using the
xed-effect (FE) method of panel data. She nds that inequality actually has a positive effect on
growth, thereby discrediting the inequality-growth model in general (similar results are obtained
by Li and Zou (1998)). However, these ndings are based on the estimation of a reduced-form
equation. It would be interesting to see whether the use of a FE method might reject a structural
equation as well, which is consistent with the Galor-Zeira model.
We begin by conducting the rst-stage regression of the FE model. Since the FE model controls
for any time-invariant country-specic characteristics, we drop any dummy variables that we
have used so far (Poor, Latin, Asia, and Africa) since they will be captured by individual country
effects. Since Poor is dropped out, only Gini appears in the rst-stage regression. As shown in
Column (1b) of Table 2.8(b), the coefcient of Gini is insignicant although it enters with the
correct sign. The insignicance of Gini precludes us from conducting the second-stage regression,
and therefore prevents us from rejecting Forbes' ndings.7
7 In practice, we could have proceeded by estimating the rst-stage regression of a random effect (RE) model. In
principle, however, the use of a RE method is unwarranted for two reasons. First, the use of a panel IV estimation
based on a RE method is inappropriate if Educ is correlated with individual country effects. Second, the unwarranted
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Table 2.8(b): Estimation with Panel Data

































Adj.R2 0:19 0:81 0:57
Obs. 226 226 226
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) conduct a Monte Carlo study of the augmented Solow growth
model using a few alternative estimation techniques. They nd that the between effect (BE)
estimator outperforms other estimators in terms of the degree of bias of the estimated coefcients.
Based on this consideration, we reestimate the rst-stage regression using a BE method. As
shown in Column (2b) of Table 2.8(b), the coefcients of Gini and Poor enter with the correct
signs; however, only the coefcient of Gini is signicant. Since both coefcients are jointly
signicant, we proceed with the second-stage regression. The results in Column (2a) indicate that
the coefcients of Educ and Invest enter with the anticipated signs and signicant. We take these
results as evidence in favor of the Galor-Zeira model.
The fact that our dependent variable, Inc2000, is measured in 2000, while some of our
explanatory variables (Invest and n) are measured as averages over the period 1970-2000 may
use of a panel IV estimation based on a FE method precludes us from evaluating the appropriateness of a RE method.
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make us susceptible to simultaneity bias (i.e., the direction of causality may run from these
variables to Inc2000 instead).8 In the growth empirics, this endogeneity issue is usually taken care
of by instrumenting the relevant regressors (Invest and n in our context) with their lagged values
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)). If the baseline results are sensitive to these changes, this is
taken as evidence that Invest and n are endogenous.
Before we do that, however, it is imperative that we test the endogeneity of Invest and n using
a Hausman test. First, we estimate the second-stage regression with and without instrumenting
Invest and n with their respective lagged values, which are measured as averages over the
period 1965-1995. Second, we test whether the difference between estimates obtained from the
regression with and without instrumentating Invest and n is statistically signicant. (Note that
Educ is always instrumented by Gini and Poor by theoretical implication.) Unfortunately, the
Hausman test fails to deliver any results in the basic specication because the variance-covariance
matrix is not positive denite. In the augmented specication, the test fails to deliver useful results
because the test statistic is negative.
As an alternative to the Hausman test, we adopt an auxiliary regression approach.9 This method
can be summarized in the following steps. First, we run the rst-stage regression for each Educ,
Invest, and (n + g + ). (Note that the rst-stage regression needs to conducted for Educ as
well.) Second, we extract residuals obtained from each rst-stage regression. Third, we run the
second-stage regression with the inclusion of these residuals using the method of ordinary least
squares (OLS). Finally, we test whether the estimated coefcients from the residuals are jointly
signicant. Performing all of these steps, we nd that the estimates are jointly signicant. We
take this result as evidence that Educ, Invest, and (n+ g + ) are endogenous.
8 Although Educ data is also an average of the period 1970-2000, this should not pose any simultaneity problem
because it is instrumented by Gini and Poor that are measured at the beginning of the period of analysis.
9 I am grateful to Dr. Carter Hill for suggesting this method as an alternative to the Hausman test; see Baum, Schaffer,
and Stillman (2003) for reference.
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Given the above results, we repeat our baseline estimation by instrumenting Invest and n with
their respective lagged values and report the estimation results in Table 2.9. In Columns (1a) and
(1b), we nd that the coefcients of all variables enter with the anticipated signs and, except for
(n+ g + ), are signicant. These results continue to hold in Columns (2a) and (2b), where we
add all regional dummies to the basic specication. Compared to the corresponding coefcients
in Table 2.3, we see that the results are fairly robust. (The only sensitive coefcients are Educ in
Column (2a) and (n+ g + ) in Columns (1a) and (2a).) We take these results as evidence that
our baseline results are not affected much by the endogeneity of Invest and n.
Table 2.9: Estimation with Instrumented Invest and n
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ







































Latin      0:463
( 1:99)
  
Asia      0:355
( 1:31)
 
Adj.R2 0:70 0:68 0:73 0:67
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
According to the Galor-Zeira model, the impact of inequality on long-run income per capita
works through a sequence of nancial constraints and education channel. That is, income
inequality imposes nancial constraints for people to invest in education, and education in turn
affects long-run income. If so, then it stands to reason that the impact can be undermined if the
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nancial constraints can somehow be relaxed. One way of doing this is for the government to
provide an education subsidy for the poor. A priori, we expect that the presence of this subsidy
would yield one of the following: either inequality or the subsidy itself becomes less signicant
and inequality declines in magnitude.
To test this idea, the value of government expenditures on education, Goveduc, is used as a
proxy for the education subsidy variable.10 Goveduc is admittedly an imperfect proxy for an
education subsidy variable because it is available to poor and non-poor alike. In the absence of a
better alternative, this variable is used anyway. We begin by entering Goveduc into, and excluding
Gini from, the rst-stage regression (i.e., Eq.(2.7)). In Column 1 of Table 2.10, the coefcient of
Goveduc enters with the correct positive sign and is signicant. In Column 2, where both Goveduc
and Gini are included, the coefcient of the former falls in magnitude and signicance while that
of the latter is negative and signicant. In both specications, the coefcient of Educ is of the
expected sign and signicant (note also that the coefcient of Gini is robust to its counterpart in
Table 2.3). We take these results as evidence in support of the Galor-Zeira model.
According to the Galor-Zeira model, the impact of income distribution on long-run income per
capita is not applicable to an initially poor society because such a society will still be nancially
constrained even if income is evenly distributed. If this is the case, then it follows that there exists a
threshold level of initial income above which inequality matters and below which it does not. This
can be done by relaxing the denition of poor countries, Poor, to include middle-income countries
as well. Renaming our previous measure of Poor as Poor1, we include two additional categories
of poor countries: a) Poor2, which is dened as the sum of Poor1 and lower-middle-income
countries and b) Poor3, which is the sum of Poor2 and upper-middle-income countries.11 A priori,
10 More specically, Goveduc is measured as the average government expenditures as a fraction of GDP for 1970-1984.
The data is taken from Barro and Lee (1994).
11 The classication of countries into lower- and upper-middle-income countries is made by the World Bank based on
the income range of these countries.
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we expect that the magnitude and signicance of Gini would decline as we vary the denition of
Poor from Poor1 to Poor2, and from Poor2 to Poor3 because this entails the relaxation of nancial
constraints. As shown in Columns (3)(5) of Table 2.10, the estimation results strongly support
this idea. We take these results as further support of the Galor-Zeira model.
Table 2.10: Estimation with Government Education
Expenditures, Alternative Measures of Poor, and Interactive Term
Specication Goveduc Goveduc Poor1 Poor2 Poor3 GiniPoor
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Obs. 45 45 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is done by 2SLS. The coefcient
of Educ comes from the second-stage regression, where Inc2000 is the dependent variable. The coefcients
of other variables come from the rst-stage regression, where Educ is the dependent variable. t-statistics are
given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Regional dummies are always included.
Another way to test the above hypothesis is by including an interactive term between Gini and
Poor in the rst-stage regression, GiniPoor. If the interactive term is signicant, this implies
that the impact of Gini on Educ is different between poor and non-poor countries. Adding this
interactive term, we reestimate the rst-stage regression corresponding to Column (2b) in Table
2.3. As shown in Column (6) of Table 2.10, however, the interactive term is insignicant. It
should be noted, however, that this poor result is driven by the high correlation between Poor
and GiniPoor (their correlation coefcient is 0.99) because the coefcient of Poor enters with
the incorrect sign and insignicant. Again, the coefcients of Gini and Educ are robust to their
counterparts in Table 2.3.
As an additional robustness check, we test whether the coefcients of Gini and Educ are
sensitive to the inclusion of other additional control variables. In practice, this is hard to implement
because different papers employ different control variables in their robustness tests. We employ
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three criteria in choosing these additional control variables. That is, the variables must not be
implied by other theoretical models in this area. Second, the variables should be sensible. Finally,
the variables should be frequently employed. (The most frequent ones are regional dummies; for
this reason, they are always included in each of our augmented specications.)
Applying these criteria, we obtain six control variables: government consumption expenditures
(Govcons), government consumption expenditures net of education spending (Govconse),
government expenditures on defense (Govdef), the price of investment (PPI), life expectancy
(Life), and the fertility rate (Fert). Each of these control variables is added one at a time in our
estimation.12 As shown in Table 2.11, the coefcient of Gini is robust to the inclusion of these
additional variables when it is compared against its counterpart in Table 2.3. However, this is not
the case with Educ, whose magnitude deviates substantially from its counterpart in Table 2.3. Note
also that the magnitudes of Gini and Educ decline considerably (and Educ becomes insignicant)
when Life and Fert are added to the regression; see Columns (5) and (6). These results suggest
that Gini may affect Inc2000 through Life and Fert channels, too. Since the coefcients of Gini
and Educ enter with the correct signs and signicant, we take these results as further support for
the Galor-Zeira model.
Previous empirical studies that analyze the inequality-growth relationship express the Gini
variable in levels (as opposed to logs). To test whether our results are robust to this variable
denition, we reestimate our baseline estimation in Table 2.3 with the Gini index expressed in
levels, Ginilev. As shown in Table B2, the coefcients of all variables retain their signs and
signicance. Hence, our baseline estimation is robust to the way Gini is expressed.
It has been suggested that a measure of the wage premium between skilled and unskilled
workers, dened as the ratio of skilled-worker wages to unskilled-worker wages, be included in
12 Each of these variables is measured as the average for 1970-1984 or 1970-1985, depending on the availability of data.
All data are taken from Barro and Lee (1994).
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the rst-stage regression in order to control for the incentive in acquiring education. We take this
variable from Caselli and Coleman (2006), who construct the variable based on some functional
relationship between wages and human capital data. A priori, we expect the coefcient of this
new variable, Prem, to be positive. Adding Prem to the specication results in the number of
observations drops to 33.
Table 2.11: Estimation with Alternative Control Variables
Specication Govcons Govconse Govdef PPI Life Fert







































Obs. 45 45 45 46 46 43
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is done by 2SLS. The coefcient
of Gini comes from the rst-stage regression, where Educ is the dependent variable while the coefcients
of Educ and additional control variables from the second-stage regression, where Inc2000 is the depen-
dent variable. t-statistics are given in parentheses. t-statistics in Columns (3) and (5) are based on White's
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. Regional dummies are always included.
We repeat our baseline estimation and show our results in Table B3. In the two versions of
the rst-stage regression (with Africa and with all regional dummies), we nd the following:
a) the coefcients of Gini and Poor enter with the correct signs (but the coefcient of Gini is
insignicant in Column (2b)), and b) the coefcient of Prem enters with the wrong sign in both
columns but is signicant in Column (1b) only. In both cases, however, these variables are jointly
signicant; so we proceed with the second-stage regression. In Columns (1a) and (2a), we nd
that a) the coefcients of Educ and Invest enter with the expected signs and signicant, and b)
the coefcient of (n+ g + ) is insignicant. Since the results on key variables remain intact, we
interpret these ndings in favor of the Galor-Zeira model .
Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) argue that the average-years-of-education variable that is usually
employed in the growth empirics (and in this paper too) merely captures the quantity of human
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capital only. To capture the quality of education as well, they suggest the inclusion of education
expenditures as a fraction of GDP as a proxy. Since this variable varies considerably across
countries, it is imperative that this variable be incorporated into our analysis. The inclusion of this
variable is left for future work.
Finally, one may argue that, given our small sample size, the asymptotic inference of IV
estimation should be complemented with the inference based on bootstrap standard errors. As
Mackinnon (2002) puts it, however, bootstrap standard errors perform poorly in models with
endogenous regressors.
In addition to estimating a structural model, we also estimate a reduced-form version of the
Galor-Zeira model where Eq.(2.7) is substituted into Eq.(2.6). The results of this reduced-form
model, which are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table B4, indicate that inequality exerts a
negative inuence on long-run income per capita. We take these ndings as further evidence,
albeit indirect, supporting the Galor-Zeira model.
2.5 Discussion
As implied by Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7), income inequality affects income per capita through
education. Since each of these variables is measured in logs, the connection between any two
variables is in the form of an elasticity. Consider Columns (1a) and (1b) in Table 2.3 again. We
observe that the coefcients of Gini and Educ are 0.71 and 1.94, respectively. This means that
a 10% increase in inequality would decrease educational investment by 7.1% and a 10% increase
in education would raise income per capita by 19.4%. Taken together, both coefcients imply
that a 10% increase in inequality would reduce the level of income per capita by 13.77% (i.e.,
19:4% ( 7:1%=10%) =  13:77%).
The above estimate is based on the impact of inequality on income through the education
channel. To measure the net effect of inequality on income, we may resort to a reduced-form
estimate described in Table B4. In Column (1) of Table B4, the counterpart of Columns (1a) and
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(1b) in Table 2.3, we see that the coefcient of Gini is 1.462. This means that a 10% increase in
inequality would decrease income per capita by 14.62%. Hence, the magnitudes of both estimates
are quite similar.
Now we compare our nding on the impact of income inequality on income with the ndings
in previous studies. In order to make our quantitative effect of inequality on income comparable
to that in previous work, we need to make a few adjustments. First, we replace our dependent
variable, Inc2000, with Growth. Second, we express Gini in levels (instead of logs). Finally,
we assess how much a one-standard-deviation change in Gini affects Growth. With these
modications, we reestimate our reduced-form model in Column (1) of Table B4. We nd that the
coefcient of Gini is 0.03 and signicant (see Column (3) in Table B4). This result implies that
an increase in income inequality by one standard deviation (i.e., 10 in our sample) is expected to
decrease economic growth by 30%.
Persson and Tabellini (1994) employ income share of the third quintile as a measure of income
equality. In Column (1) of their Table 5, they report that the coefcient of this variable is 0.189
and signicant. This implies that an increase in income equality by one standard deviation (i.e.,
3 in their sample) is expected to increase growth by 0.57%. Perotti (1996) employs income share
of the third and fourth quintiles as a measure of income equality. In Column (1) of his Table 4,
he reports that the coefcient of this variable is 0.118 and signicant. This suggests that a rise in
income equality by one standard deviation (i.e., 0.16 in his sample) is expected to increase growth
by 0.58%. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) employ the Gini coefcient in 1960 (measured in levels) as
a measure of income inequality. In Column (6) of their Table 1, they report that the coefcient of
Gini is 5.23. This implies that a rise in Gini by one standard deviation (i.e., 0.16 in their sample)
is expected to decrease growth by almost 0.84%. Sylwester (2000) employs the Gini coefcient
in 1970 (also measured in levels) as a measure of income inequality. In Column (1) of his Table
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1, he reports that the coefcient of Gini is 0.0007. This suggests that a rise in inequality by one
standard deviation (i.e., 10 in his sample) is expected to decrease growth by 0.7%. Finally, Forbes
(2000) employs lagged values of Gini (also measured in levels) as a measure of income inequality.
In Column (4) of her Table 3, she reports that the coefcient of Gini is 0.0013. This implies that a
rise in inequality by one standard deviation (i.e., 10 in her sample) is expected to increase growth
by 1.3%. Taken together, these ndings indicate that the impact of income inequality on economic
growth takes a very close range of values, from as low as 0.57% (Persson and Tabellini's ndings)
to as high as 0.84% (Alesina and Rodrik's nding). Therefore, our estimate is too high.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis to test the implications of the Galor-Zeira
model based on a cross-section of 46 countries during the period 19702000. Our baseline
analysis in Table 2.3 yields the results that income inequality exerts a negative impact on long-run
per capita income, and it does so through the education channel (which has a positive impact on
income). These ndings continue to hold when we a) replace our dependent variable, Inc2000,
with a typical variable in the growth regression, Growth, b) expand the sample size by using panel
data and employ the pooled IV method, c) employ the BE method, d) add government education
expenditures variable to the specication, e) vary the threshold of poor countries from low-income
countries to upper-middle-income countries, f) employ alternative control variables, g) express the
Gini variable in levels, and h) add wage premium variable in the baseline estimation. However,
we obtain unfavorable results when we a) expand the sample size by curtailing the period of
analysis to 19802000, b) replace a stock measure of human capital variable by a ow measure, c)
employ the FE method in panel data estimation, and d) include the interactive term between Gini
and Poor. Overall, the balance of evidence appears to be broadly consistent with the theoretical
implications of the Galor-Zeira model.
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Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of our study. First, our ndings
are based on a cross-country data that excludes many African countries. Since most of them
are poor-income countries, our results may be driven by this omission. Second, the Galor-Zeira
model conjectures that the link between inequality and education is bridged by nancial or credit
constraints. However, we have not been able to test this link due to the unavailability of data on
credit constraints. It has been argued that nancial constraints are likely to be reduced as countries
develop their nancial institutions. If so, measures of the level of nancial development such as
the ones considered by Levine (1997) could be used as proxies for the lack of credit constraints.
The incorporation of these measures is left for future work.
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Chapter 3 Empirical Analysis of the Kremer-Chen Model
3.1 Introduction
In the 1990s, there has been renewed interest in the relationship between income inequality
and economic growth. Although there is a consensus among economists that there is an adverse
impact of inequality on growth, there is a disagreement over the channel in which inequality
affects growth. Some economists conjecture that inequality and growth are linked by the
interaction between redistributive scal policy and physical capital investment; this is known as
the political economy model. Other economists postulate that they are linked by the interaction
between socio-political instability and physical capital investment; this is called the socio-political
instability model. Still others argue that they are linked by the interaction between credit
constraints and human capital investment; this is known as the credit constraint model. Recently,
a handful of economists have conjectured yet another channel: inequality and growth are linked
by the interaction between fertility and human capital investment. According to this so-called
endogenous fertility model, income inequality is bad for growth because a fertility differential
between poor and rich households rises with a rise in inequality. The increase in this fertility
differential, in turn, results in a lower stock of human capital and income per capita.
The theoretical literature which examines the impact of income inequality on economic growth
through a fertility differential includes Dahan and Tsiddon (1998), Kremer and Chen (2002), De
La Croix and Doepke (2003), and Moav (2005). In Dahan and Tsiddon (1998) and De La Croix
and Doepke (2003), the impact of a fertility differential on growth is transitory (i.e., the economy
ends up with a single steady state in the long run.) In Kremer and Chen (2002) and Moav (2005),
however, the impact of a fertility differential on growth is permanent (i.e., the economy ends
up with multiple steady states in the long run). Given the burgeoning evidence on multiple
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steady states in the literature [see Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005)], the models developed
by Kremer and Chen (2002) and Moav (2005) are more realistic. Between these two, there is
little to choose from. In Kremer and Chen (2002), a fertility differential is achieved through the
notion that rich (as opposed to poor) households are time constrained to raise many children. In
Moav (2005), a fertility differential is achieved through the premise that poor (as opposed to rich)
households have a comparative disadvantage in providing education to their children.
The empirical literature which investigates the inequality-fertility-growth link includes Peretto
(1996), Barro (2000), Kremer and Chen (2002), and De La Croix and Doepke (2003). In Peretto
(1996) and Barro (2000), however, the analysis is carried out in terms of overall fertility (as
opposed to a fertility differential). This is not surprising given the fact that their studies are
motivated by early endogenous fertility models that ignore a fertility differential. Kremer and
Chen (2002) conduct an empirical analysis based on their own theoretical model and nd evidence
that inequality has a positive effect on the fertility differential between poor and rich households.
Building upon Kremer and Chen's study, De La Croix and Doepke (2003) nd evidence that the
fertility differential has a negative impact on economic growth. Despite these encouraging results,
each of these papers focuses on one part of the inequality-fertility-growth link only. That is,
Kremer and Chen focus on the link between inequality and the fertility differential only while De
La Croix and Doepke focus on the link between the fertility differential and growth only.
Since none of these empirical studies investigates the impact of income inequality on growth
though a fertility differential as a system, this paper attempts to ll this gap. In doing so, we
recognize that a high fertility differential between poor and rich households implies a low ratio of
skilled to unskilled labor. Given this connection, we conduct a cross-country empirical analysis
for 46 countries during the 1970-2000 period which systematically tests the relationship between
inequality, the skilled-unskilled labor ratio, and long-run income per capita as implied by the
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Kremer-Chen model. In the baseline analysis, we nd that income inequality has a negative impact
on the skilled-unskilled labor ratio, which in turn has a positive impact on per capita income in
the long run. These baseline results are broadly robust across alternative model specications and
samples. We do obtain unfavorable results in some robustness checks. However, there is evidence
that these poor results are due to a reduced sample size in one case, and a multicollinerity problem
in another case. Given these qualications, we conclude that our empirical analysis produces
evidence that lends support to the Kremer-Chen model.
We begin our analysis in Section 3.2 by describing the model developed by Kremer and Chen
(2002). In Section 3.3, we specify our empirical model and then discuss the data employed in the
paper. In Section 3.4, we report and discuss our baseline and robustness analyses. In Section 3.5,
we discuss how our main results relate to those in previous studies. In Section 3.6, we conclude
by highlighting the major ndings of our paper.
3.2 The Kremer-Chen Model
Kremer and Chen (2002) introduce a representative agent model of the economy with
endogenous fertility decisions. (A shortened version of Kremer and Chen (2002) circulates under
Kremer and Chen (1999).) That is, households make a conscious decision on the optimal number
of children that they wish to have. This optimal decision hinges on the trade-off that households
face between the quantity and quality of children that they wish to have. This trade-off arises from
the total cost of raising children, which consists of direct cost (food, clothing, and education)
and indirect cost (the opportunity cost of raising children). As household incomes rise, the direct
cost of childrearing (as a fraction of the total cost of childrearing) becomes less important; thus,
education (which is part of the direct cost) rises with income. As their incomes rise, however,
the indirect or opportunity cost of childrearing becomes more prominent; hence, fertility declines
with income. As a result, rich people tend to have few yet more educated children and poor people
tend to have many yet less educated children. It follows, then, that the higher the fertility and
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education differentials are, the smaller the stock of human capital and the lower the level of per
capita income in the future.
To formalize the model, Kremer and Chen make the following assumptions. First, optimal
fertility is a decreasing function of wages. (This assumption is actually a result of other
assumptions; see Appendix C.) This is due to the substitution effect of a wage increase: the
opportunity cost of childrearing rises as household income increases. However, this inverse
relationship is most likely applicable to middle-income households only. For very poor
households, a rise in wages is probably going to generate an income effect as the direct cost of
childrearing as a fraction the total cost falls with a rise in income. For very rich households, a
further rise in wages is unlikely going to reduce fertility anymore. There must be a threshold level
of income below and above which fertility is not affected by changes in wages. For these reasons,
Kremer and Chen postulate that a fertility differential between poor and rich households is most
likely applicable to middle-income countries.
Second, educational decisions depend on the incentives provided by wage premium; i.e, the
ratio of wages earned by skilled workers to wages earned by unskilled workers, ws=wu. Third,
children of unskilled (poor) parents face higher costs of education, cH , than children of skilled
(rich) parents, cL. More precisely, they assume that all children of skilled parents and a fraction 
of children of unskilled parents face cL costs of education while the remaining fraction (1  ) of
children of unskilled parents face cH costs of education.(These varying costs of education among
children of unskilled workers are essential in generating multiple steady states.) Suppose that each
individual is endowed with a total working period which is normalized to unity, 1. Letting the
costs of education be measured in units of time, then the total working period available to those
who obtain education is equal to (1  ci) for i = s; u . Based on the rst assumption, we deduce
the following:
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(1  ci)ws  wu: (3.1)
That is, each individual will a) choose to acquire education if the lifetime income from
obtaining education is greater than the lifetime income from not obtaining education, and b) be
indifferent about acquiring education if the lifetime income from obtaining education is equal to






That is, each individual will a) invest in education if the wage premium between skilled and
unskilled workers is greater than the ratio of working period available to unskilled workers to
working period available to skilled workers, and b) be indifferent about investing in education if
the wage premium is equal to the ratio of the working periods. Note that ci contains two parts, cL
and cH . Therefore, 1=(1  ci) contains two parts too, 1=(1  cL) and 1=(1  cH). Since cL < cH ,








From Eq.(3.3), we can deduce the following: First, if ws=wu = 1=(1   cL), then low-cost
individuals will be indifferent about obtaining education but high-cost individuals will not obtain
education. Second, if ws=wu = 1=(1   cH), then low-cost individuals will obtain education
but high-cost individuals will be indifferent. Third, if ws=wu 2 (1=(1  cL); 1=(1  cH)), then
low-cost individuals will obtain education but high-cost individuals will not.
Let Ls be the number of skilled workers, Lu the number of unskilled workers, and R the ratio
of skilled to unskilled workers, R = Ls=Lu. Then, it can be shown that the wage premium is
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equal to the inverse of the skilled-unskilled worker ratio, ws=wu = 1=R (see Appendix C). Given
this relationship, the above deductions can be stated in terms of R as follows. First, if R = 1  cL,
then low-cost individuals will be indifferent about obtaining education but high-cost individuals
will not obtain education. Second, if R = 1  cH , then low-cost individuals will obtain education
but high-cost individuals will be indifferent. Third, if R is between (1  cH) and (1  cL), then
low-cost individuals will obtain education but high-cost individuals will not.
Now let us consider the dynamics of the model. Let nst be the number of children born to each
skilled worker and nut the number of children born to each unskilled worker. Hence, the number
of children of skilled and unskilled workers can be expressed as the product of the number of the
respective workers and the number of their children: Cst = Lstnst; Cut = Lutnut.
Recall from the preceding discussion that unskilled workers have more children than skilled
workers, Cst < Cut. In order for the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers to be constant, this
fertility differential has to be offset by postulating that some children of unskilled workers
becoming skilled workers later on. This is accomplished by assuming that a fraction t of children
of unskilled workers become skilled. If we dene Rt as the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers at











Given Rt+1, we can deduce the following: First, if Rt+1 = 1   cL, then the fraction  of
children of unskilled workers who become skilled will be less than or equal to the fraction  of
children of unskilled workers who incur low costs of education. This conclusion follows from
the conjecture that low-cost individuals will be indifferent about obtaining education if R =
1  cL. So, some of them may actually end up not pursuing education. Second, if Rt+1 = 1  cH ,
then the fraction  of children of unskilled workers who become skilled will be more than or
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equal to the fraction  of children of unskilled workers who incur low costs of education. This
result follows from the postulate that high-cost individuals will be indifferent about acquiring
education if R = 1   cL. So, some of them may actually end up pursuing education. Third, if
Rt+1 2 (1  cH ; 1  cL), then the fraction  of children of unskilled workers who become skilled
will be equal to the fraction  of children of unskilled workers who incur low costs of education.
This prediction follows from the premise that low-cost individuals will obtain education but
high-cost individuals will not obtain education if R 2 (1  cH ; 1  cL). We can summarize these
conjectures as follows:
t   if Rt+1 = 1  cL
t =  if Rt+1 2 (1  cH ; 1  cL)
t   if Rt+1 = 1  cH
(3.5)
Note that, when  = , Eq.(3.4) can be rewritten as
Rt+1 =
R2t + 
1    R: (3.6)
Given Eqs.(3.5) and (3.6), it can be shown that (see Appendix D) Rt evolves according to
Rt+1 =
8<: 1  cL if R  1  cLR if R 2 (1  cH ; 1  cL)1  cH if R  1  cH
9=; (3.7)
Eq.(3.7) can be alternatively represented by a nonlinear curve as depicted in Figure 3.1. The
gure shows that there are two stable steady states (marked by points A and C) and one unstable
steady state (marked by point B). The critical point is point B because the long-run ratio of skilled
to unskilled labor, R, is positively related to the fraction of the initial ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor, R0, that exceeds this point: the larger the fraction of R0 that exceeds this point, the higher
the R, and vice versa. The higher the R, in turn, implies the larger stock of human capital and
the higher the level of per capita income. To the extent that unskilled labor can be identied with
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poor households, we reach the following conclusion: an economy characterized by an initially











Figure 3.1: The Dynamics of Kremer-Chen Model
3.3 Model Specication and Data
We begin by specifying our model based on the description of the Kremer-Chen model. We
proceed by comparing our specication with the related ones in the literature. We conclude by
describing the data used in this paper based on our model specication.
3.3.1 Model Specication
Based on the conclusions of the Kremer-Chen model, we conjecture that a country has a great
prospect to improve itself in the future if its income is more equally distributed among its citizens.
Thus, a priori we expect that a measure of income inequality will have an adverse impact on
a country's future income. Since this implication is arguably to be most likely applicable to
middle-income countries, we need to qualify our analysis by introducing a dummy variable for
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each poor and rich country. Since income inequality affects future income through the ratio of
skilled to unskilled labor, we need to estimate a structural model consisting of two equations. In
the rst equation, income is a function of the skilled-unskilled labor ratio and other explanatory
variables in the Solow growth model. In the second equation, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor
is a function of income inequality, a dummy variable for poor countries, and a dummy variable for
rich countries. Our structural model looks as follows:
Income = 1 + 2: (Ls=Lu) + 3:Invest + 4: (n+ g + ) + u; (3.8)
Ls=Lu = 1 + 2:Gini+ 3:Poor + 4:Rich+ v; (3.9)
where Income is the level of long-run income per capita, (Ls=Lu) is the ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor, Invest is the amount of physical capital investment, (n+ g + ) is the sum of
the rates of population growth, technological change, and capital depreciation, Gini is the Gini
index which measures the degree of income inequality, Poor is a dummy variable equal to one for
an initially poor country and zero otherwise, and Rich is a dummy variable equal to one for an
initially rich country and zero otherwise. A priori, we expect the coefcients of Gini, Poor, and
(n+ g + ) to be negative and the coefcients of (Ls=Lu) and Invest to be positive. It is unclear,
though, what sign the coefcient of Rich will take; hence, its coefcient can be either positive or
negative.
3.3.2 Related Model Specications
At this point, it is imperative that we compare our specication with the specication employed
in previous studies. Kremer and Chen (2002) estimate the following model:
Fertd = 1 + 2:Gini+ x
0
 + "; (3.10)
where Fertd is the fertility differential, Gini is a measure of income inequality, x is a vector
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of control variables (such as initial income and regional as well as time dummy variables), and
" is the error term. The Fertd variable is the tted value of the overall fertility obtained from
regressing the overall fertility variable on average years of education; therefore, Fertd measures
the variation in the overall fertility that is explained by educational attainment.
De La Croix and Doepke (2003) estimate the following model:
Growth = 1 + 2:Fertd + x
0
+"; (3.11)
where Growth is the growth rate of income per capita (other variables and coefcients are as
described before).
As mentioned earlier, both Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10) merely test part of the endogenous fertility
model. A better approach would be to specify a model that is capable of testing the model as a
system. This can be accomplished by specifying a structural model. It turns out that an earlier
empirical analysis by Perotti (1996) does this. In particular, Perotti (1996) estimates the following
structural model:
Growth = 1 + 2:Fert + x
0
 + u; (3.12)
Fert = 1 + 2:Mid + v; (3.13)
where Fert is the overall fertility and Mid is the income share of the third and fourth quintiles
of the population. Hence, Mid is a measure of income equality (as opposed to income inequality).
Despite the similarity between Perotti's specication and ours, there is one notable difference.
That is, he employs a measure of the overall fertility as opposed to the fertility differential as
implied by the endogenous fertility model. Instead of employing a measure of the fertility
differential, we deviate further by utilizing a measure of the human capital differential (i.e., the
ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor). This measure is a perfectly acceptable alternative to the
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fertility differential because the fertility differential implies the human capital differential. Indeed,
this measure is more appropriate because we use actual human capital differential data rather than
estimated fertility data used by Kremer and Chen (2002).
Finally, it should be mentioned that our model specication is fundamentally different from
the one employed by Barro (2000) in the sense that we utilize structural equations in Eqs.(3.8)
and (3.9) whereas he uses a reduced-form equation of the neoclassical growth model. He nds
that the impact of Gini on Growth depends on whether Fert is added to the specication: when
Fert is added, Gini has zero impact on Growth; when Fert is omitted, Gini has a signicant,
negative impact on Growth. This difference notwithstanding, Barro's ndings suggest that income
inequality affects economic growth through the fertility rate channel.
3.3.3 Basic Data
On the basis of the preceding discussion, we believe that our specication in Eqs. (3.8) and
(3.9) is appropriate. We proceed by collecting the cross-country data for all of the variables
identied in those equations. It turns out that the Gini data imposes a severe restriction on the
number of available observations. Given this restriction, we are able to collect the required data
for 46 countries during the period 1970-2000 for the following variables:
 Inc2000: This variable is dened as the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The data is taken
from the Penn World Table version 6.1 (PWT6.1).
 Invest: This variable is dened as the log of the annual average of the ratio of investment to
GDP during the period 1970-2000. The data is taken from PWT6.1.
 (n+ g + ): This variable is dened as the log of the sum of the rates of population growth
(n), technological change (g), and capital depreciation (). The population growth rate (n) is
dened as the annual average of the population growth rate during 1970-2000. The data is
taken from PWT6.1. Following the literature, we set g +  = 0:05.
 Gini: This variable, which measures the degree of income inequality, is dened as the log
of the Gini index in 1970 or its closest neighboring period as long as it does not exceed
1975. The data is taken from Deininger and Squire (1996), who make the necessary efforts to
compile high-quality income inequality data. In particular, they impose three stringent quality
criteria for the data to be acceptable. First, data must be based on household surveys (not from
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national accounts that make some assumptions about patterns of income inequality). Second,
data must be based on comprehensive coverage of population (not based on some segments
of population only). Third, data must be based on comprehensive coverage of income sources
(not based on wage incomes only but also nonwage incomes).
 Poor: This variable is dened as a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for any countries that
are classied by the World Bank as low-income countries in 1972 (and 0 otherwise); this
classication is made based on the income range of these countries. There are 5 low-income
countries in our sample. The data is taken from the World Tables 1976, published by the
World Bank.
 Rich: This variable is dened as a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for any countries that
are classied as high-income countries by the World Bank in 1972 (and 0 otherwise) based on
the income range of these countries. There are 13 high-income countries in our sample. The
data is taken from the World Tables 1976, published by the World Bank.
 Ls=Lu: This variable is dened as the log of the ratio of the amount of skilled labor to
unskilled labor during the period 1970-2000. The amount of skilled labor is dened as the
percentage of population who have attained certain level of education multiplied by the
quantity of labor. The data on the percentage of population with certain education level is
taken from Barro and Lee (2001) while the data on labor force is taken from PWT6.1.
Since there are three levels of education (primary, secondary, and tertiary), we could construct
three different measures of skilled labor. Nonetheless, we follow Duffy, Papageorgiou, and
Perez-Sebastian (2004) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) in considering six alternative measures
of skilled labor: a) workers who have attained complete tertiary education (Ls0), b) workers who
have attained at least some tertiary education (Ls1), c) workers who have attained at least complete
secondary education (Ls2), d) workers who have attained at least some secondary education (Ls3),
e) workers who have attained at least complete primary education (Ls4), and f) workers who have
attained at least some primary education (Ls5). Given these six measures, the corresponding
measures of unskilled labor can be calculated residually. For example, if skilled labor is dened as
in (a), then unskilled labor is dened as any workers who have not completed tertiary education.
Similarly, if skilled labor is dened as in (b), then unskilled labor is dened as any workers who
have not attained any tertiary education. Of all these alternative measures of skilled labor plus
workers who have not received any education at all (Lu), workers who have attained at least
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some and complete primary education (Ls5 and Ls4)account for a large bulk of all workers in our
46-country sample over the period 1970-2000 (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Relative Size of Alternative Measures of Skilled Labor







































































Notes: Entries in the cells and parentheses are the number of workers (in thousands) and their
percentages (in percentage points), respectively.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
Using cross-country data for 46 countries during the period 1970-2000, we conduct an
empirical analysis of the Kremer-Chen model based on Eqs.(3.8) and (3.9). In particular, Eq.(3.8)
is estimated by the instrumental variable (IV) method, where (Ls=Lu) is instrumented by Gini,
Poor, and Rich. In other words, Eq.(3.9) serves as the rst-stage regression while Eq.(3.8) the
second-stage regression.13
3.4.1 Basic Analysis
Since there are six alternative measures of skilled and unskilled labor, we estimate our model
specication using all of them (one at a time) and report the results in Tables 3.23.7. Table 3.2
shows the estimation results when skilled labor is dened as workers who have attained complete
tertiary education. In Column (1b), which corresponds to the rst-stage regression, we see that
the coefcients of Gini and Poor enter with the expected signs and signicant at the 1% level. The
coefcient of Rich is positive and signicant at the 5% level. Since these coefcients are also
13 Since Invest and (n + g + ) are assumed to be exogenous, their coefcients will enter the rst-stage regression
as well to ensure that Educ is estimated with the optimal set of instruments; see Chapter 5 of Wooldridge (2002).
However, these exogenous variables have little meaning in the rst-stage regression. Hence, their coefcients will be
suppressed from the rst-stage regression results.
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jointly signicant at the 5% level, we proceed with the second-stage regression. In Column (1a),
which corresponds to the second-stage regression, we observe that the coefcients of (Ls0=Lu0),
Invest, and (n+ g + ) enter with the anticipated signs and signicant at the 1% level. These
results clearly lend support to the Kremer-Chen model.
Table 3.2: Baseline Estimation with Ls0=Lu0
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Ls0=Lu0 Inc2000 Ls0=Lu0








































Latin      0:227
( 0:95)
 
Asia     0:046
(0:18)
  
Adj. R2 0:63 0:54 0:65 0:53
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
One may argue that our evidence is tempered by the failure to control for institutional and
cultural factors that might differ across regions. To accommodate this objection, we add two
regional dummy variables for Asian and Latin American countries and reestimate the model. As
shown in Column (2b), the inclusion of these regional dummies does not affect the signs and
signicance levels of Gini, Poor, and Rich. However, the magnitude of Gini does rise substantially.
Since these coefcients are also jointly signicant, we proceed with the second-stage regression.
In Column (2a), we see that the magnitudes, signs, and signicance levels of (Ls0=Lu0), Invest,
and (n+ g + ) are not affected by the inclusion of these regional dummies. In addition, the
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coefcient of Latin enters with the negative sign but is insignicant, and the coefcient of Asia
enters with the positive sign and signicant at the 5% level. We take these results as evidence in
favor of the Kremer-Chen model.
Table 3.3 reports the estimation results when skilled labor is dened as workers who have
attained at least some tertiary education. In Column (1b), we observe that the coefcients of Gini,
Poor, and Rich enter with the correct signs and signicant at the 1% level. Since these coefcients
are also jointly signicant at the 5% level, we proceed with the second-stage regression. In
Column (1a), we see that the coefcients of (Ls1=Lu1), Invest, and (n+ g + ) enter with the
correct signs and signicant at least at the 5% level. As before, we add regional dummies to the
specication; see Columns (2a) and (2b). Once again, we see that the inclusion of these regional
dummies does not affect the magnitudes, signs, and signicance levels of the coefcients of most
variables. An exception to these results is the coefcient of Gini: its size has risen appreciably. In
this case, however, the coefcients of regional dummies are insignicant. Overall, the ndings
appear to lend support to the Kremer-Chen model.
Table 3.4 shows the results when skilled labor is dened as workers who have attained at least
complete secondary education. In Column (1b), we see that the coefcients of Gini, Poor, and
Rich enter with the correct signs and signicant at the 1% level. Since these coefcients are also
jointly signicant at the 5% level, we proceed with the second-stage regression. In Column (1a),
we see that the coefcients of (Ls2=Lu2), Invest, and (n+ g + ) enter with the correct signs
and signicant at least at the 5% level. Now we add regional dummies to the specication; the
results are reported in Columns (2a) and (2b). As before, the inclusion of these regional dummies
does not affect the magnitudes, signs, and signicance levels of the coefcients of most variables.
However, the magnitude of (n+ g + ) falls substantially and it becomes insignicant. We
interpret these ndings as evidence that lends support to the Kremer-Chen model.
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Table 3.3: Baseline Estimation with Ls1=Lu1
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Ls1=Lu1 Inc2000 Ls1=Lu1























































Adj. R2 0:71 0:64 0:71 0:64
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 3.4: Baseline Estimation with Ls2=Lu2
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Ls2=Lu2 Inc2000 Ls2=Lu2







































Latin      0:191
( 0:91)
 
Asia      0:209
( 0:95)
 
Adj. R2 0:72 0:60 0:73 0:60
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.5 documents the results when skilled labor is dened as workers who have attained
at least some secondary education. Column (1b) shows that the coefcients of Gini, Poor, and
Rich enter with the correct signs and, except for Gini, are signicant at the 1% level; note that
the coefcient of Gini is signicant at the 5% level. Column (1a) shows that the coefcients
of (Ls3=Lu3), Invest, and (n+ g + ) enter with the correct signs and, except for (n+ g + ),
are signicant at the 1% level; note that the coefcient of (n+ g + ) is insignicant. Columns
(2a) and (2b) show the results when regional dummies are added to the specication. Once
again, the presence of these dummies does not affect the sizes, signs, and signicance levels of
the coefcients of most variables. There are two exceptions to these results: the magnitude of
Rich rises whereas the magnitude of (n+ g + ) declines. Unlike the previous exercises, the
coefcients of regional dummies are signicant here (albeit at the 10% level only). We take these
results as evidence supporting the Kremer-Chen model.
Table 3.5: Baseline Estimation with Ls3=Lu3
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Ls3=Lu3 Inc2000 Ls3=Lu3







































Latin      0:325
( 1:70)
  
Asia      0:361
( 1:80)
  
Adj. R2 0:73 0:60 0:77 0:64
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.6 reports the results when skilled labor is dened as workers who have attained at least
complete primary education. Columns (1a) and (1b) show that the coefcients of Gini, Poor, Rich,
(Ls4=Lu4), and Invest enter with the correct signs and signicant at the 1% level. These results
continue to hold when regional dummies are included; see Columns (2a) and (2b). In addition,
the magnitudes of these coefcients are fairly robust to the addition of regional dummies. In both
cases, with and without regional dummies, the coefcient of (n+ g + ) enters with the wrong
sign and insignicant. Finally, the coefcients of regional dummies are insignicant. We conclude
that these results lend support to the Kremer-Chen model.
Table 3.6: Baseline Estimation with Ls4=Lu4
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Ls4=Lu4 Inc2000 Ls4=Lu4







































Latin      0:068
( 0:31)
 
Asia      0:160
( 0:72)
 
Adj. R2 0:73 0:69 0:73 0:68
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 3.7 shows the results when skilled labor is dened as workers who have attained at
least some primary education. In this case, however, only 43 observations are available because
the (Ls5=Lu5) data are undened for three countries (Finland, Japan, and New Zealand) due to
division by 0. Columns (1a) and (1b) show that the coefcients of Poor, Rich, (Ls5=Lu5), and
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Invest enter with the correct signs and signicant at the 1% level. However, the coefcients of
Gini and (n+ g + ) are insignicant (although Gini enters with the correct sign). When regional
dummies are added to the specication (see Columns (2a) and (2b)), we notice quite a few drastic
changes in terms of the signicance of the coefcients (Gini and (n+ g + ) become signicant)
and the magnitudes of the coefcients (Ls5=Lu5, Poor, and Rich). Since these results are sensitive
to the addition of regional dummies, we take them as evidence against the Kremer-Chen model.
Table 3.7: Baseline Estimation with Ls5=Lu5
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Ls5=Lu5 Inc2000 Ls5=Lu5







































Latin      0:696
( 2:67)
  
Asia      0:109
( 0:37)
 
Adj. R2 0:47 0:72 0:60 0:78
Obs. 43 43 43 43
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
One may justiably argue that these poor results are due to the reduction in sample size. In
response to this objection, we repeat the analysis in Tables 3.23.6 with 43 observations. It turns
out that the reduced sample size does not affect the results in those tables (see Tables D1D5
in Appendix D). Therefore, we conclude that the threshold level of skilled labor cannot be
represented by workers who have attained at least some primary education; they need to be more
educated than this in order to be considered skilled labor.
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The preceding discussion suggests that all of the above measures of skilled labor (except
the last one) are empirically plausible. However, the maximum impact of Gini on Inc2000
(which is calculated from the coefcients of Gini in the rst-stage regression and (Ls=Lu) in the
second-stage regression) is achieved when skilled labor is dened as those who have attained
at least some tertiary education. This denition of skilled labor makes much sense because
the ability to think and learn complex concepts (such as learning a new computer language) is
probably highly correlated with the ability to pursue college education. Accordingly, we take
(Ls1=Lu1) as the best measure of skilled-unskilled labor ratio to be employed in the subsequent
robustness analysis.
3.4.2 Robustness Analysis
One may argue that our baseline results might be due to an exceedingly small sample size,
46. This problem, in turn, arises because the data on Gini is not available for many countries in
early years. Therefore, one way to increase the sample size would be to curtail the sample period
to 1980-2000. However, doing so will increase the sample size only marginally; the sample
size becomes 61 instead of 46. Another way to increase the sample size would be to work with
panel data (as opposed to cross-sectional data). So we construct a panel data of countries with a
ve-year interval during 1970-2000, where Gini, Poor, and Rich are measured at 1970, 1975, . . . ,
1995, Invest and (n+ g + ) are measured as averages of 1971-1975, 1976-1980, . . . , 1996-2000,
and Income and (Ls1=Lu1) are measured at 1975, 1980, . . . , 2000. Including only those data for
which there are at least two consecutive observations, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 53
countries and 226 observations.
Given this substantially expanded number of observations, we reestimate our model by the
pooled IV method and document the results in Table 3.8(a). Columns (1a) and (1b) show that
the coefcients of Gini, Poor, Rich, (Ls1=Lu1), Invest, and (n+ g + ) enter with the anticipated
signs and signicant at the 1% level. Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table 3.3,
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however, the coefcients of Gini and Poor do not appear to be robust.14 When we add regional
dummies to the specication, we see that most results remain intact (see Columns (2a) and (2b)).
However, the magnitudes of Gini and (n+ g + ) have changed considerably. It should also
be noted that the coefcients of Latin and Asia are signicant. Compared to the corresponding
coefcients in Table 3.3, we see that there is a considerable change in the magnitudes of Gini,
(n+ g + ), and Latin. Despite all of these changes, the coefcients of key variables continue to
deliver the same message. Therefore, we conclude that these ndings lend further support to the
Kremer-Chen model.
Table 3.8(a): Panel Data Estimation
Dep.Variable Income Ls1=Lu1 Income Ls1=Lu1







































Latin      0:230
( 1:90)
  
Asia      0:335
( 3:12)
  
Adj. R2 0:59 0:52 0:70 0:53
Obs. 226 226 226 226
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Kristin Forbes (2000) argues that the negative impact of income inequality on growth could be
attributed to omitted variable bias. To overcome this problem, she estimates her model based on
14 A coefcient is said to be robust if its sign, magnitude, and signicance level is similar to the corresponding
coefcient in the baseline estimation. In terms of magnitude, their similarity is determined by whether their difference
is within one standard deviation. In the baseline estimation, one standard deviation of Gini, Poor, Rich, (Ls1=Lu1),
Invest, (n+ g + ), Latin, and Asia is 0:25, 0:31, 0:46, 0:98, 0:52, 0:14, 0:46, and 0:47, respectively.
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the xed effect (FE) method of panel data. Following her argument, we conduct the rst-stage
regression of the FE model. Since the FE model controls for any time-constant country-specic
effects, we drop any dummy variables that we have employed so far (they will be captured by
country-specic effects). Therefore, we end up with four explanatory variables for the rst-stage
regression: Gini, Rich, Invest, and (n+ g + ).15 As shown in Column (1b) of Table 3.8(b),
however, the coefcient of Gini is not signicant. Furthermore, Gini and Rich are jointly
insignicant, and this prevents us from conducting the second-stage regression. We take these
ndings as evidence against the Kremer-Chen model.16
Table 3.8(b): Panel Data Estimation





































Adj. R2 0:26 0:76 0:66
Obs. 226 226 226
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estima-
tion is done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second-
and rst-stage regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parenthe-
ses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
15 Note that Rich is not time-constant; it varies over time as some countries shift their position between middle- and
high-income countries.
16 In practice, we could have proceeded by estimating the random effect (RE) model. In principle, however, the use
of a RE method is unwarranted for two reasons. First, the use of a panel IV estimation based on a RE method is
inappropriate if (Ls1=Lu1) is correlated with individual country effects. Second, the unwarranted use of a panel
IV estimation based on a FE method precludes us from evaluating the appropriateness of a RE method through a
Hausman test.
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Hauk and Wacziark (2004) conduct a Monte Carlo study of the augmented Solow growth
model using a few alternative estimation techniques. They nd that the between effect (BE)
estimator outperforms other estimators in terms of the degree of bias of the estimated coefcients.
Based on this consideration, we reestimate our model using a BE method and report the results
in Columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 3.8(b). There we see that the coefcients of Gini, Poor, Rich,
(Ls1=Lu1), and Invest enter with the correct signs and signicant at the 1% level. Compared
to the corresponding coefcients in Table 3.3, we see that there is an appreciable change in the
magnitude and signicance of (n+ g + ), signicance of regional dummies, and magnitude of
Gini. Overall, however, these results lend support to the Kremer-Chen model.
The fact that our dependent variable, Inc2000, is measured in 2000, while some of our
explanatory variables (Invest and n)17 are measured as averages over the period 1970-2000 may
make us susceptible to simultaneity bias (i.e., the direction of causality may run from these
variables to Inc2000 instead). In the growth empirics, this endogeneity issue is usually taken
care of by instrumenting the relevant regressors with their lagged values (see, for example, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004)). In our context, if the baseline results are sensitive to these changes,
then this is taken as evidence that the suspected regressors (Invest and n in our context) are
endogenous.
Before we do that, however, it is imperative that we test the endogeneity of Invest and n using
a Hausman test. First, we estimate the second-stage regression with and without instrumenting
Invest and n with their respective lagged values, which are measured as averages over the
period 1965-1995. Second, we test whether the difference between estimates obtained from
the regression with and without instrumentating Invest and n is statistically signicant. (Note
that (Ls1=Lu1) is always instrumented by Gini, Poor, and Rich by theoretical implication.)
17 Although (Ls1=Lu1) data is averaged over the period 1970-2000, this should not pose any simultaneity problem
because it is instrumented by Gini, Poor, and Rich that are measured at the beginning of the period of analysis.
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Unfortunately, the Hausman test fails to deliver any results in the basic specication because the
variance-covariance matrix is not positive denite. In the augmented specication, the test fails to
deliver useful results because the test statistic is negative.
As an alternative to the Hausman test, we adopt an auxiliary regression approach.18 This
method can be summarized in the following steps. First, we run the rst-stage regression for
each (Ls1=Lu1), Invest, and (n + g + ). (Note that the rst-stage regression needs to conducted
for (Ls1=Lu1) as well.) Second, we extract residuals obtained from each rst-stage regression.
Third, we run the second-stage regression with the inclusion of these residuals using the method
of ordinary least squares (OLS). Finally, we test whether the estimated coefcients from the
residuals are jointly signicant. Performing all of these steps, we nd that the estimates are jointly
signicant. We take this result as evidence that (Ls1=Lu1), Invest, and (n+ g+ ) are endogenous.
Given the above results, we repeat our baseline estimation with Invest and n instrumented
by their respective lagged values and report the results in Table 3.9. In Columns (1a) and (1b),
we nd that the coefcients of all variables enter with the expected signs and signicant. These
results continue to hold when we add regional dummies to the basic specication (see Columns
(2a) and (2b)). Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table 3.3, we see that the results are
quite robust. We take these results as evidence that our baseline results are not affected much by
the endogeneity of Invest and n.
Previous work that employs the (Ls=Lu) data points out that the way skilled and unskilled
labor is dened suffers from an aggregation problem. For example, the (Ls1=Lu1) data that we use
treat workers with different levels of education equally. If labor is paid according to its marginal
revenue product, then workers with a higher level of education should be given a greater weight
than workers with a lower level of education. To overcome this aggregation problem, we follow
Duffy, Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian (2004) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) in weighting
18 I am grateful to Dr. Carter Hill for suggesting this method; see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003) for reference.
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the (Ls1=Lu1) data according to the marginal revenue product of labor (see Appendix E for
details). Unfortunately, the weighting procedure requires some additional data on the return to
education and on the duration of education at various levels. It turns out that data on the return to
schooling is not available for many countries, and this results in the reduction of our sample size
to 30. Therefore, we opt to work with the panel data of countries. Utilizing the same panel data
set as before, but interacting it with data on the return to education and the duration of education,
yields an unbalanced panel of 32 countries and 145 observations.
Table 3.9: Estimation with Instrumented Invest and n
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Ls1=Lu1 Inc2000 Ls1=Lu1








































Latin      0:194
( 0:85)
 
Asia      0:065
( 0:24)
 
Adj. R2 0:71 0:64 0:70 0:67
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
With this weighted (Ls1=Lu1) data, we reestimate our model by the pooled IV method, the
results of which are documented in Table 3.10. Columns (1a) and (1b) show that the coefcients
of all variables enter with the correct sign and, except for Gini and (n+ g + ), are signicant
at the 1% level. The coefcient of (n+ g + ) is signicant at the 10% level only whereas the
coefcient of Gini is insignicant. Compared to the corresponding coefcients in Table 3.2, we
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see that there is a huge change in the magnitude and signicance of Gini, and the magnitude
of Poor, Invest, and (n+ g + ). When we add regional dummies to the specication, we see
that the magnitude of Poor declines considerably, and the coefcient of (n+ g + ) loses its
signicance; see Columns (2a) and (2b). The coefcients of other variables remain stable in terms
of magnitudes, signs, and signicance levels. Compared to the corresponding coefcients in
Table 3.2, we see that there is a signicant change in the magnitude and signicance of Gini and
(n+ g + ), and the magnitude of Poor and Invest. Since the coefcient of Gini is insignicant
with and without regional dummies, these results are taken as evidence against the Kremer-Chen
model.19
Table 3.10: Panel Data Estimation with Weighted Ls1=Lu1
Dep.Variable Income Ls1=Lu1 Income Ls1=Lu1 Ls1=Lu1 Ls1=Lu1
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Latin      0:031
( 0:13)
     
Asia      0:143
( 0:44)
     
Adj. R2 0:47 0:40 0:54 0:41 0:37 0:52
Obs. 145 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is done by 2SLS; columns (a) and
(b) report results from the second- and rst-stage regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parenthe-
ses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
One way to interpret these unfavorable results is that the Kremer-Chen model is rejected when
it is confronted with a better (weighted) human capital data. But this view cannot be tested. A
19 We obtain similarly poor results when we employ FE and BE methods; see Columns (3b) and (4b) in Table 3.10.
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testable interpretation of these poor results is that they are driven by the reduction in sample size
from 226 to 145. To test this hypothesis, we reestimate our model using the original unweighted
(Ls1=Lu1) data with 145 observations. The results, which are reported in Table D6 of Appendix
D, show that the coefcient of Gini is insignicant. Therefore, we conclude that our results are
sensitive to sample size.
According to the Kremer-Chen model, the impact of income inequality on long-run income per
capita is unlikely to be applicable to poor and rich countries. For poor countries, this is the case
because the income effect dominates; for rich countries, this is the case because the substitution
effect becomes weaker (see Section 3.2). If so, then it follows there exists a threshold level of
initial income below and above which inequality does not matter. This can be done by relaxing
the denition of poor and rich countries to include some middle-income countries.
Renaming our previous measures of Poor and Rich as Poor1 and Rich1, we include two
additional categories of poor and rich countries: Poor2 is dened as the sum of Poor1 and
lower middle-income countries, and Rich2 is the sum of Rich1 and the top one-third of upper
middle-income countries. (Poor2 contains 10 countries and Rich2 19 countries.) A priori, we
expect that the magnitude and signicance of Gini would decline with these new measures,
Poor2 and Rich2, because this implies the strengthening of the income effect and the weakening
of substitution effect. Columns (1)(4) of Table 3.11 report how the estimates of Gini change
when we vary the threshold levels of poor and rich countries. We observe that the magnitude and
signicance of Gini alternate between ups and downs. We take these results as evidence against
the Kremer-Chen model.
Another way to test the above hypothesis is by including the interactive terms, GiniPoor and
GiniRich, in the rst-stage regression. If the interactive terms are signicant, then this implies
that the impact of Gini on (Ls1=Lu1) is different between poor, rich, and middle-income countries.
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As shown in Column (5) of Table 3.11, however, the interactive terms are insignicant. We take
this result as evidence against the Kremer-Chen model. However, there is a caveat: this poor result
might be due to the high correlation between Poor and GiniPoor (their correlation coefcient is
0.99), and Rich and GiniRich (their correlation coefcient is 0.99).
Table 3.11: Estimation with Alternative Measures of
Poor and Rich, Interactive Terms, and Fertility Differential
Specication Poor1, Poor2, Poor1, Poor2, GiniPoor, Fertd
Rich1 Rich1 Rich2 Rich2 GiniRich













GiniPoor          1:023
( 0:64)
 
GiniRich         1:012
(0:78)
 















Obs. 46 46 46 46 46 43
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is done by 2SLS. The coefcients
of (.) and Fertd come from the second-stage regression, where Inc2000 is the dependent variable. The
coefcients of other variables come from the rst-stage regression, where (.) is the dependent variable.
Regional dummies are always included in the second-stage regression. t-statistics are given in parentheses. t-
statistic in Column (6) is based on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. ***, **, and * denote
statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
According to the Kremer-Chen model, the impact of income inequality on long-run income
per capita works through the fertility channel. That is, income inequality results in a fertility
differential, and the fertility differential in turn results in human capital differential, (Ls=Lu). If
so, the impact of inequality on (Ls=Lu) will be weakened if a measure of fertility differential
is added to the specication. To test this hypothesis, a measure of fertility differential, Fertd,
is added to the second-stage regression.20 A priori, we expect that the presence of Fertd would
yield one of the following: either the magnitude and signicance level of Gini will decline or
the coefcient of Fert is insignicant. As shown in Column (6) of Table 3.11, the coefcient
20 Following Kremer and Chen (2002), Fertd is the tted value of the overall fertility rate, Fert, when it is regressed
against educational attainment, Educ. Data on Fert is taken from Barro and Lee (1994) while data on Educ is taken
from Barro and Lee (2001).
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of Fertd is signicant, the coefcient of Gini is insignicant, and the coefcient of (Ls1=Lu1)
enters with the incorrect sign and insignicant. We conclude that these results lend support to the
Kremer-Chen model.
As a further robustness check, we test whether the coefcients of Gini and (Ls1=Lu1) are
sensitive to the inclusion of additional control variables. In practice, this is hard to implement
because different papers employ different control variables in their robustness tests. To make
this exercise more manageable, we employ three criteria in choosing these additional control
variables. First, the variables must not be implied by other theoretical models in this area. Second,
the variables should make an intuitive sense. Third, the variables should be frequently employed.
Applying these criteria, we obtain ve control variables: government consumption
expenditures (Govcons), government consumption expenditures net of education spending
(Govconse), government expenditures on defense (Govdef), the price of investment (PPI), and life
expectancy (Life). Each of these variables is added one at a time in the second-stage regression.21
As shown in Table 3.12, in terms of their signs and signicance, the coefcients of Gini and
(Ls1=Lu1) are robust to the inclusion of these variables. In terms of their magnitudes, however,
the coefcient of (Ls1=Lu1) is sensitive to the inclusion of all control variables (the coefcient of
Gini is robust). However, since the main results continue to hold, we take them as further support
for the Kremer-Chen model.
Previous work that analyzes the inequality-growth relationship expresses Gini in levels (as
opposed to logs). To test whether our results are robust to this variable denition, we reestimate
our baseline estimation in Table 3.3 with Gini expressed in levels, Ginilev. As shown in Table D7
in Appendix D, the coefcients of all variables retain their signs and signicance. We take these
results as further evidence in favor of the Kremer-Chen model.
21 Each of these variables is measured as the average for 1970-1984 or 1970-1985, depending on the availability of data.
All of these data are taken from Barro and Lee (1994).
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Table 3.12: Estimation with Alternative Control Variables
Specication Govcons Govconse Govdef PPI Life


































Obs. 45 45 45 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies and additional control variables, all variables are expressed in logs.
Estimation is done by 2SLS. The coefcient of (.) and additional control variables come from the
second-stage regression, where Inc2000 is the dependent variable. The coefcients of other variables
come from the rst-stage regression, where (.) is the dependent variable. Regional dummies are
always included. t-statistics are given in parentheses. t-statistic in Column (5) is based on White's
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Given our small sample size and the asymptotic inference of IV estimation, it is tempting to
complement our IV analysis with the inference based on bootstrap standard errors. However, this
temptation should be resisted in light of the evidence that bootstrap standard errors perform poorly
in models with endogenous regressors; see Mackinnon (2002).
In addition to estimating a structural model, we also estimate a reduced-form version of the
Kremer-Chen model where Eq.(3.9) is substituted into Eq.(3.8). As reported in Columns (1) and
(2) of Table D8, however, the results of this reduced-form equation are not so clear-cut. That is,
although the coefcient of Gini enters with the expected sign in both columns, it is signicant in
Column (1) only.
3.5 Discussion
As implied by Eqs.(3.8) and (3.9), income inequality affects income per capita through human
capital differential, (Ls=Lu). Since each of these variables is measured in logs, the linkage
between any two variables is in the form of an elasticity. Consider Columns (1a) and (1b) in Table
3.3 again. The coefcients of Gini and (Ls1=Lu1) are 1.61 and 0.68, respectively. This implies
that a 10% increase in inequality would decrease the human capital differential by 16.1% and
a 10% increase in the human capital differential would raise income per capita by 6.8%. Taken
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together, both coefcients imply that a 10% increase in inequality would reduce income per capita
by 10.95% (i.e., 6:8% ( 16:1%=10%) =  10:95%.)
The above estimate is based on the impact of inequality on income through the human
capital differential channel. To measure the net effect of inequality on income, we look at the
reduced-form estimate described in Table D8. The counterpart of Columns (1a) and (1b) in Table
3.3 is Column (1) in Table D8. There, we see that the coefcient of Gini is 1.003. This implies
that a 10% increase in inequality is expected to decrease income per capita by 10.03%. Hence, the
magnitudes are quite similar.
Now we compare our nding on the impact of income inequality on income with the ndings
in previous studies. In order to make our quantitative effect of inequality on income comparable
to that in previous work, we need to make a few adjustments. First, we replace our dependent
variable, Inc2000, with Growth. Second, we express Gini in levels (instead of logs). Finally,
we assess how much a one-standard-deviation change in Gini affects Growth. With these
modications, we reestimate our reduced-form model in Column (1) of Table D8. We nd that the
coefcient of Gini is 0.03 and signicant (see Column (3) in Table D8). This result implies that
an increase in income inequality by one standard deviation (i.e., 10 in our sample) is expected to
decrease economic growth by 30%.
Persson and Tabellini (1994) employ income share of the third quintile as a measure of income
equality. In Column (1) of their Table 5, they report that the coefcient of this variable is 0.189
and signicant. This implies that an increase in income equality by one standard deviation (i.e.,
3 in their sample) is expected to increase growth by 0.57%. Perotti (1996) employs income share
of the third and fourth quintiles as a measure of income equality. In Column (1) of his Table 4,
he reports that the coefcient of this variable is 0.118 and signicant. This suggests that a rise in
income equality by one standard deviation (i.e., 0.16 in his sample) is expected to increase growth
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by 0.58%. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) employ the Gini coefcient in 1960 (measured in levels) as
a measure of income inequality. In Column (6) of their Table 1, they report that the coefcient of
Gini is 5.23. This implies that a rise in Gini by one standard deviation (i.e., 0.16 in their sample)
is expected to decrease growth by almost 0.84%. Sylwester (2000) employs the Gini coefcient
in 1970 (also measured in levels) as a measure of income inequality. In Column (1) of his Table
1, he reports that the coefcient of Gini is 0.0007. This suggests that a rise in inequality by one
standard deviation (i.e., 10 in his sample) is expected to decrease growth by 0.7%. Finally, Forbes
(2000) employs lagged values of Gini (also measured in levels) as a measure of income inequality.
In Column (4) of her Table 3, she reports that the coefcient of Gini is 0.0013. This implies that a
rise in inequality by one standard deviation (i.e., 10 in her sample) is expected to increase growth
by 1.3%. Taken together, these ndings indicate that the impact of income inequality on economic
growth takes a very close range of values, from as low as 0.57% (Persson and Tabellini's ndings)
to as high as 0.84% (Alesina and Rodrik's nding). Therefore, our estimate is too high.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis to test the implications of the Kremer-Chen
model based on a cross-section of 46 countries during the period 19702000. Our baseline
analyses in Tables 3.23.6 (with alternative proxies for human capital differential) yield the results
that income inequality exerts a negative impact on long-run per capita income, and it does so
through the human capital differential channel (which has a positive impact on income). These
ndings continue to hold when we a) employ the pooled IV method of panel data, b) employ the
BE method of panel data, c) add the fertility differential variable to the specication, d) employ
alternative control variables, and d) express the Gini variable in levels. However, we obtain
unfavorable results when we a) employ the FE method of panel data, and b) vary the threshold
levels of poor and rich countries.
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At rst glance, it seems that poor results are also obtained when we a) employ the weighted
measure of human capital differential, and b) include the interactive terms, GiniPoor and
GiniRich, into the specication. However, there is evidence that poor results in (a) are due to a
reduced sample size whereas poor results in (b) are due to the multicollinearity problem. Given
these qualications, the preponderance of evidence on the robustness check is skewed toward our
baseline results. Therefore, we conclude that our analysis yields results that lend support to the
Kremer-Chen model.
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Chapter 4 A Reexamination of the Convergence Hypothesis
4.1 Introduction
According to Solow (1956), if economies are structurally similar,22 then poor economies tend
to grow faster than rich ones; if this tendency exists, then economies tend to converge to each other
in terms of the level of per capita income over time because economic growth tends to slow down
the richer the economies become. If convergence occurs among economies, then all economies
will eventually enjoy similar standards of living regardless of their initial positions. Given this
staggering welfare implication, the issue is whether this convergence hypothesis is borne out by
the experience of modern economies.
One of the earliest empirical studies on this issue is Baumol (1986). He nds that a small
sample of countries exhibits convergence in the level of per capita income over the period
1870-1979. His analysis, however, has been criticized by De Long (1988) on the ground of
sample selection bias. That is, Baumol happens to pick a sample of rich countries in 1979. When
De Long repeats the Baumol's analysis using a sample of rich countries in 1870, he nds that
convergence does not occur.
Next, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) (MRW hereafter) discover that these earlier studies do
not include any control variables in their growth regressions as implied by the Solow model. When
these control variables are added to the growth regression, MRW (1992) nd that convergence
does take place among a large sample of countries. Their convergence ndings, known as
conditional convergence, have been conrmed by Islam (1995), Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort
(1996), and Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997), among others.23
22 Economies are said to have similar structures if they have similar steady-state determinants such as the rate of
technological progress, the saving rate, the population growth rate, and the capital depreciation rate.
23 Of course, these researchers improve on MRW's analysis by using more sophisticated estimation methods such as
xed effects estimation and generalized method of moments. Furthermore, unlike MRW, they nd that countries
appear to converge at a much faster rate.
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Durlauf and Johnson (1995) question the use of a linear growth regression model on a sample
of apparently heterogeneous countries. One way to capture this country heterogeneity is to rely
on multiple-regime models such as the model of Azariadis and Drazen (1990). According to this
model, countries converge to multiple steady states depending on their levels of human capital.
The idea is that there exist some threshold levels of human capital below which productivity is
stagnant and above which productivity accelerates. As a result, economic growth is sluggish
(accelerated) when human capital is below (above) the threshold. It follows then that countries
whose level of human capital is below (above) the threshold level will converge to a low (high)
steady-state level of income. When Durlauf and Johnson partition countries into a few regimes
based on this threshold variable using a regression tree method, they nd evidence in support of
multiple regimes. Their convergence ndings, known as club convergence, have been conrmed
by others using a variety of statistical methods; see Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005)
(hereafter DJT). Since then, club convergence has become conventional wisdom in the growth
literature.
Recently, however, researchers have even expressed reservations about the use of any growth
regression models to study convergence among countries (again, see DJT (2005) for a lengthy
survey of econometric issues in growth economics). They claim that regression-based convergence
studies are inadequate to establish convergence because they do not analyze the entire growth
distribution. To illustrate, consider a standard growth regression model
ln (yit=yi0) = +  ln (yi0) + x
0
it + "it;
where yit is the level of per capita income for country i at time t, yi0 is the level of per capita
income for country i at time 0 or the level of initial per capita income (hence the left-hand-side
variable is the growth rate of per capita income), xit is a vector of control variables, "it is an error
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term,  is the intercept,  is the coefcient of interest (i.e., the convergence coefcient), and  is a
vector of parameters of control variables.
Since convergence implies that economic growth tends to slow down the richer a country
becomes, a negative and statistically signicant coefcient of the initial income ( < 0) in a
growth regression model is usually taken as evidence of convergence. However, this coefcient
merely captures the conditional mean of the growth rates; thus, it is inadequate to establish
evidence of convergence.
Apparently, an analysis of the entire growth distribution requires a departure from a regression-
based model. This can be done by resorting to methods such as the stochastic dominance
method.24 In brief, this method works as follows: given the growth distribution for two groups
of countries, X and Y, then convergence is said to occur if the growth distribution of X fails to
stochastically dominate that of Y and vice versa. If the growth distribution of X dominates that of
Y or vice versa, then they diverge from each other.
To begin with, the growth distribution of X and Y can be represented by their probability
density functions (PDFs).25 X is said to stochastically dominate Y if the PDF of X lies to the right
of the PDF of Y (see Figure 4.1). If their PDFs have the same means, then Asia still stochastically
dominates Africa as long as the area under the PDF of X is smaller than the area under the PDF
of Y (see Figure 4.2). This implies that divergence has occurred between X and Y. However, a
regression-based analysis would conclude that convergence has occurred between X and Y since
it is based on the mean of the distribution.
24 Another method which analyzes the entire distribution is called the transition matrix method due to Quah (1996).
25 To dene a PDF, let X denote a random variable X and x the value that X may take. Then, the PDF of X , denoted as
f(x), is the probability that X takes the value x, f(x) = P [X = x]. If X is a continuous variable, then f(x) = 0.
Hence, the PDF ofX for a continuous variable is dened over a range of values thatX may take. A related concept is
known as cumulative distribution function (CDF). The CDF of X , denoted by F (x), is dened as the probability that
X takes a value less than or equal to x, F (x) = P [X  x]. They are related to each other in the sense that a CDF
is the integral of a PDF (or a PDF is the derivative of a CDF). Since the integral of a function always exists but the
derivative of a function may or may not exist, the concept of CDF is more general. Therefore, stochastic dominance




Figure 4.1: f(x) (solid line) has a larger mean than f(y) (dashed line)
x,y
f(x),f(y)
Figure 4.2: f(x) (solid line) has a smaller variance than f(y) (dashed line)
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To date, the application of stochastic dominance techniques to the convergence analysis is
very limited.26 This limited application includes Anderson (2004a) and Maasoumi, Racine, and
Stengos (2006) (hereafter MRS). Anderson (2004a) studies how the growth distribution of a
large sample of countries evolves over multiple time periods. In most cases, he nds evidence in
favor of convergence. His analysis is fairly brief in two senses. First, he considers the growth
distribution of the world only; it remains to see how different regions of the world evolve over
time. Second, the fact that he merely considers the world distribution precludes him from
conducting interregional analyses. MRS (2006) analyze how the growth distribution of OECD vs.
Non-OECD countries evolves over multiple time periods. In terms of absolute convergence, they
nd that Non-OECD countries fail to converge to OECD countries in many different time periods.
In terms of conditional convergence, they nd that Non-OECD countries appear to be converging
to OECD countries. While their analysis is more elaborate, it remains to see how other country
groups (Africa, Latin America, and Asia) fare against OECD countries and against one another.
This paper tries to ll the gap accordingly. In particular, we employ a particular stochastic
dominance test due to Davidson and Duclos (2000) to study convergence among many different
groups of countries. Our main ndings can be decomposed into interregional and intertemporal
analyses. For interregional analysis, we obtain evidence in support of conditional convergence
in most cases considered. (We obtain inconclusive evidence in two out of 10 cases considered.)
For intertemporal analysis, we obtain the following. First, African countries are converging to
each other. Second, Asian countries are diverging from each other. Third, OECD countries are
diverging from each other. Finally, all countries in the world are diverging from each other. (The
26 Of course, here we refer to growth convergence studies among countries. For if we are talking about income
convergence studies, there are quite a few such studies that use stochastic dominance methods. These include
Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1992), who study the distribution of income between South and Non-South U.S. states
over time; Anderson (1996), who analyzes the distribution of household income in Canada over time; Maasoumi
and Heshmati (2000), who investigate the Swedish income distribution over time; and Anderson (2004b), who
analyzes the world income distribution over time. Stochastic dominance methods have also been applied to poverty
convergence studies such as Bishop, Formby, and Smith (1993), who analyze the extent of poverty across 10 Western
countries, and Madden and Smith (2000), who study the extent of poverty in Ireland.
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evidence is mixed for Latin American countries.) These intertemporal ndings suggest that,
except for Africa, there is an intraregional divergence among countries. We take these results
as evidence in favor of the club convergence hypothesis. For Africa, however, it seems that the
continent as a whole is converging to a low steady-state equilibrium. Coupled with interregional
ndings, these intertemporal ndings suggest that, once structural features are held constant, there
is an intraregional (but not interregional) mobility among countries. We take these results as
evidence in support of the club convergence hypothesis, which in turn, is evidence in support of
the phenomenon of multiple regimes among countries.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the most frequently used measures
of stochastic dominance. Section 4.3 discusses the specic stochastic dominance test employed in
this paper. Section 4.4 presents the results of our convergence studies. Section 4.5 synthesizes our
ndings with the convergence literature. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Stochastic Dominance
It is convenient to discuss the method of stochastic dominance in the context of convergence
among countries. Suppose we want to analyze whether there is a tendency for two groups of
countries, say the OECD and Non-OECD countries, to converge to each other in terms of growth
rates over time. To apply the stochastic dominance method, we need to consider the distribution
of the growth rate of per capita income for both the OECD and Non-OECD countries over a
period of time, say, 19602000. Convergence is said to occur if a) the growth distribution of the
OECD countries fails to stochastically dominate that of the Non-OECD countries, and b) the
growth distribution of the Non-OECD countries fails to stochastically dominate that of the OECD
countries.
How do we measure the stochastic dominance of one growth distribution over another growth
distribution? There are three frequently used measures of stochastic dominance: rst-order
stochastic dominance (FSD), second-order stochastic dominance (SSD), and third-order stochastic
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dominance (TSD). As their names partially imply, all of these measures can be expressed in terms
of various orders of the integral of a PDF.





where x is the growth rate of per capita income, z is the upper limit of x under consideration,
f(x) is the PDF of x, andD1(z) is the CDF of x up to z. (A CDF is usually denoted by F (x); here
it is denoted byD1(z) to signify that it is the rst-order integral of a PDF.) Graphically,D1(z) can





Figure 4.3: Curve D1(z) and Area Underneath It, D2(z)







where D2(z) is the second-order integral of a PDF. Graphically, D2(z) can be shown as the
area under the curve D1(z) in Figure 4.3.
TSD can be expressed in terms of the third-order integral of a PDF, which is equivalent to the





where D3(z) is the third-order integral of a PDF. Graphically, D3(z) can be shown as the
volume under the surface D1(z1; z2) (see Figure 4.4).
To measure the stochastic dominance of one growth distribution over another growth
distribution, we need two growth distributions. For concreteness, let D1X (z) represent the CDF
of the OECD countries and D1Y (z) the CDF of the Non-OECD countries. Then, the stochastic
dominance of the OECD countries over the Non-OECD countries can be established as follows.
First, FSD of the OECD countries over the Non-OECD countries is achieved if D1X (z) 
D1Y (z) for all nonnegative z. Graphically, this can be shown by the curve D1X (z) being no higher
than the curve D1Y (z) for all values of z (see Figure 4.5). We take this result as evidence of
divergence between the OECD and Non-OECD countries. If the two distributions cross each other
for some values of z, then FSD cannot be established. We take this nding as lack of evidence of
divergence between the OECD and Non-OECD countries. However, we can still nd evidence of











Figure 4.5: X FSD Y since DX(z)  DY (z)
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Second, SSD of the OECD countries over the Non-OECD countries is achieved if
D2X (z)  D2Y (z) for all z. Graphically, this can be shown by the area under the curve D1X (z)
being no greater than the area under the curve D1Y (z) for all values of z (see Figure 4.6). As
before, this result can be taken as evidence of divergence between the OECD and Non-OECD
countries. If the area under D1X (z) is greater than the area under D1Y (z) for some z, then SSD
cannot be established; we conclude that there is lack of evidence of divergence. In the latter case,






Figure 4.6: X SSD Y since Area under DX(z)  DY (z)
Third, TSD of the OECD countries over the Non-OECD countries is achieved if
D3X (z)  D3Y (z) for all z. Graphically, this can be shown by the volume under the surface
D1X (z1; z2) being no larger than the volume under the surface D1Y (z1; z2) for all values of z (see
Figure 4.7). We conclude that divergence has taken place between the OECD and Non-OECD
countries. If the volume under the surface D1X (z1; z2) is larger than the volume under the surface
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D1Y (z1; z2) for some z, then TSD cannot be established. We conclude that there is lack of evidence





Figure 4.7: X TSD Y since Volume under DX(z1; z2)  DY (z1; z2)
The stochastic dominance test was introduced by Beach and Davidson (1983) for FSD.
Subsequent work by McFadden (1989) and Bishop, Formby and Thistle (1992) extended the
test to SSD. More recently, the test has been extended to TSD by Anderson (1996), Davidson
and Duclos (2000), and Barrett and Donald (2003) (hereafter, the last two will be respectively
referred to as DD and BD). Of the rst two, a recent Monte Carlo study by Tse and Zhang (2004)
favors the test developed by DD (2000). Of the last two, there appears to be a trade-off between
(a) the ability to take into account the covariance structure between two distributions, and (b)
the ability to conduct tests at all points. DD (2000) dominate BD (2003) on the former but are
dominated by BD (2003) on the latter. That is, DD (2000) take into account the covariance
structure of distributions but fail to conduct tests at all points while BD (2003) can conduct tests at
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all points but cannot consider the covariance structure of distributions. A Monte Carlo experiment
conducted by BD (2003) does not provide clear-cut guidance as to which test is better. However,
Anderson (2004a) notes that the problem associated with (b) is trivial. For this reason, we are
going to employ the DD (2000) test.
4.3 The Davidson-Duclos Test
In Section 4.2, we discussed how stochastic dominance can be expressed up to the third order.
To generalize, let s be a positive integer up 3, s = f1; 2; 3g.27 Then, s-order dominance can be











(z   x)s 1 dF (x)
If we have N observations of xi, then the estimate of Ds (z) can be written as

















where I(:) in the second equality is an indicator function whose value is equal to one when its
argument is true and zero otherwise, and the subscript + in the third equality indicates that the
calculation will only be carried out if z > xi.
27 As a matter of fact, s can be any positive integer. However, the stochastic dominance test employed in this paper
merely considers up to TSD.
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4.3.1 Economic Interpretations
The rst three orders of stochastic dominance can be given distinct economic interpretations.
In doing so, we will adopt the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) classication of poverty. According
to FGT, poverty can be classied into three indices: poverty incidence, poverty intensity, and
poverty severity. It turns out that these indices correspond to the estimate of Ds (z) in Eq.(4.1)
above for s = f1; 2; 3g.
To illustrate, note that if s = 1, then Eq.(4.1) reduces to








where k is the ith observation when xi = z (i = 1; 2; :::; k; :::; N ). In the poverty dominance
analysis, xi is the level of income for household i, z is the poverty line, k is the number of
households such that xi  z (or the number of poor households), and N is the number of
households. Therefore, k=N captures the fraction of households who are poor. For this reason,
this measure is called the poverty incidence index. In our analysis, xi is the growth rate of per
capita GDP for country i, z is the upper limit of x set by the researcher, k is the number of
countries such that xi  z, and N is the number of countries. Hence, k=N captures the fraction
of countries whose xi  z. By analogy, this measure is called the growth incidence index.
Accordingly, FSD can be interpreted as the divergence incidence index.
If s = 2, then Eq.(4.1) reduces to




(z   xi)+ =
1
N
[(z   x1) + (z   x2) + :::+ (z   z)] :
In the poverty dominance analysis, bD2 (z) captures the average of the sum of the gap of the
poor's income from the poverty line. The advantage of this measure over the previous one is
that, instead of simply reporting how many people are poor, it measures how poor the poor are
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(i.e., how far they fall below the poverty line). For this reason, this measure is called the poverty
intensity index. By analogy, this measure is called the growth intensity index in our analysis.
Accordingly, SSD can be interpreted as the divergence intensity index.
If s = 3, then Eq.(4.1) reduces to








(z   x1)2 + (z   x2)2 + :::+ (z   z)2

:
In the poverty dominance analysis, bD3 (z) captures the average of the sum of the squared gap
of the poor's income from the poverty line. The advantage of this measure over the preceding
one can be inferred from the fact that the gap between the poverty line and a particular household
income is weighted more the smaller the income is. Hence, instead of simply reporting how
poor the poor are, it measures how severe their plight is. For this reason, this measure is called
the poverty severity index. By analogy, this measure is called the growth severity index in our
analysis. Accordingly, TSD can be interpreted as the divergence severity index.
4.3.2 Estimation and Inference
Consider two country groups, X and Y, where the number of countries in X and Y are denoted
by, respectively, N and M. Then, the estimates of D1X (z) and D1Y (z) can be written as
bDsX (z) = 1N (s  1)!
NX
i=1
(z   xi)s 1+ and bDsY (z) = 1M (s  1)!
MX
i=1
(z   yi)s 1+ (4.2)
where xi is the growth rate for country i in X and yi is the growth rate for country i in Y.
To test for stochastic dominance, DD (2000) propose two types of tests; the rst is based on
the Wald statistic and the second is based on the t-statistic. In both tests, we test the following
hypotheses:
H0 : bDsX (z)  bDsY (z)  0 vs: bDsX (z)  bDsY (z) > 0 (4.3)
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The null hypothesis states that the growth distribution of X and Y weakly diverges from each
other in the sense that X may potentially dominate Y while the alternative hypothesis states
the growth distribution of X and Y strictly diverges from each other in the sense that Y strictly
dominates X (see the operators "" and ">"). If the null hypothesis can be rejected, then we
conclude that Y dominates X. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then there is a possibility
that X dominates Y. In this ambiguous case, we may reverse the position of X and Y. If the null
hypothesis can be rejected, then we conclude that X dominates Y. If the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected once again, then we conclude that X and Y converge to each other.
The null hypothesis can be rejected if the s-order dominance can be established. To determine
whether the s-order dominance can be established, we utilize a modied Wald statistic proposed
by Wolak (1989):
W s (z) =
h bDsX (z)  bDsY (z) ui2
V ar
h bDsX (z)  bDsY (z)i ; (4.4)
where bDsX (z) and bDsY (z) are given by Eq.(4.2), V ar h bDsX (z)  bDsY (z)i is given by
V ar
 bDsX (z)  bDsY (z) = V ar h bDsX (z)i+ V ar h bDsY (z)i  2 Cov h bDsX (z) ; bDsY (z)i ; (4.5)
where V ar





































(z   xi)s 1+ (z   yi)
s 1




and u is some weight variable. Wolak (1989) shows that, under the null hypothesis, W s(z)
is asymptotically distributed as a mixed chi-squared random variable (without u, W s(z) is
asymptotically distributed as a pure chi-squared random variable).
BD (2003) note that Eq.(4.4) implies that we need to calculate the solutions to a large number
of quadratic programming problems in order to estimate the weight variable, u. This means that
we need to use a simulated Wald statistic. The procedure is as follows: pick some values of z,
estimate the weight variable, calculate the Wald statistic, and then calculate its associated p-value.
The decision rule can be stated as follows: if p-value < 0.05, then the null hypothesis can be
rejected at the 5% level and we conclude that X and Y diverge from each other.
An alternative to using the Wald statistic would be to use the t-statistic:
ts (z) =
h bDsX (z)  bDsY (z)ir
V ar
h bDsX (z)  bDsY (z)i ; (4.9)
and test the hypotheses of the form
H0 : bDsX (z)  bDsY (z) = 0 vs: bDsX (z)  bDsY (z) 6= 0: (4.10)
DD (2000) show that, under the null hypothesis, ts(z) is asymptotically distributed as a
standard normal variable. This implies that we can use a regular t test. As noted by Tse and
Zhang (2004), however, this means that we need to test the hypothesis for all values of z, which
28 If we assume that X and Y are independent, then Cov(:) = 0. If we assume that X and Y are dependent, then
Cov(:) 6= 0. When we incorporate the covariance term, however, the matrix of V ar(:) in Eq.(4.5) turns out to be not
positive denite in some cases. Hence, we follow the standard practice of assuming Cov(:) = 0:
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is impossible. To get around this problem, DD (2000) suggest that we pick some values of z,
calculate their corresponding t-values, but use a conservative critical value from a studentized
maximum modulus (SMM) distribution, which was tabulated in Stoline and Ury (1979).
Instead of testing the null hypothesis in (4.10), we may test the null hypothesis in (4.3). In
this case, instead of testing the null hypothesis based on individual t-values, we pick the maximal
t-value (MT) out of those individual t-values, compare it against a critical value from the SMM,
and then calculate its associated p-value. As before, if p-value < 0.05, then the null hypothesis
in (4.4) can be rejected at the 5% level and we conclude that X and Y diverge. In this paper, we
follow BD (2003) by using the MT statistic approach.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
Our analysis is based on the growth rates of GDP per capita for a sample of 100 countries
during the period 19602000. Data are obtained from the Penn World Table, version 6.1
(PWT6.1). To conform to stochastic dominance theory, these data have been adjusted to be
nonnegative. This is done by shifting the PDF of a growth distribution to the right in such a way
that the minimum value of growth rates is set to zero.
A few points should be mentioned about the data. First, data for Singapore and Taiwan are
available up to, respectively, 1996 and 1998 only; we extrapolate the missing observations by
assuming that each country grew at the same rate as Hong Kong. This assumption is based on
the fact that these countries are at a similar stage of economic development. Second, data for
Germany are available during the period 1970-2000 only; we extrapolate the missing observations
by assuming that Germany grew at the same rate as Japan. This assumption is based on the fact
that both of these war-devastating countries grew at similar rates during the period 1970-1980.
4.4.1 Basic Analysis
Now we apply this stochastic dominance method to the study of growth convergence among
countries. Our study is divided into interregional and intertemporal analyses. To conduct the
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interregional analysis, our 100-country sample is partitioned into four regions: Africa (36
countries), Latin America (21 countries), Asia (20 countries), and OECD countries (24 countries).
4.4.1.1 Interregional Analysis
We begin by testing whether the null hypothesis can be rejected between any two different
regions. If these two regions are Africa and the rest of the world (ROW), then the test is
implemented as
H0 : bDsAfrica (z)  bDsROW (z)  0 vs: bDsAfrica (z)  bDsROW (z) > 0:
The null hypothesis says that Africa and ROW weakly diverge from each other in the sense
that Africa may potentially dominate ROW, while the alternative hypothesis says that Africa and
ROW strictly diverge from each other in the sense that ROW surely dominates or outperforms
Africa. Therefore, if the null can be rejected, then we conclude that ROW dominates Africa. If
the null cannot be rejected, we may reverse the position of Africa and ROW. Now if the null can
be rejected, then we conclude that Africa dominates ROW. If the null cannot be rejected, then we
conclude that Africa and ROW converge to each other. Instead of stating "X and Y diverge in the
sense that X dominates Y," we will simply state "X dominates Y" in the following discussion.
We employ three types of tests: the conservative MT statistic (CMT), the simulated MT statistic
(SMT), and the Wald statistic (Wald).
We begin by testing whether the null hypothesis can be rejected between Africa and other
country groups; the results of our analysis are presented in Table 4.1. For Africa vs. ROW, we
nd that the null can be rejected at any order at 1% for all tests. Hence, we conclude that ROW
dominates Africa. For Africa vs. OECD countries, we nd that the null can be rejected at any
order at 1% for all tests. Hence, we conclude that OECD countries dominate Africa. For Africa
vs. Asia, again the null can be rejected at any order at 1% for all tests. Hence, we conclude that
93
Asia dominates Africa. For Africa vs. Latin America, the null can be rejected at FSD at 1% but
cannot be rejected at SSD and TSD even at 5% based on CMT. Using SMT and Wald statistics,
however, the null can be rejected at any order at least at 5%. Hence, we have mixed evidence that
Latin America dominates Africa.
Table 4.1: Africa vs. Non-Africa
Original Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:000 0:000 0:000
ROW SMT 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000
CMT 0:000 0:000 0:000
OECD SMT 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000
CMT 0:000 0:000 0:000
Asia SMT 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000
CMT 0:010 0:068 0:108
Latin SMT 0:007 0:021 0:032
Wald 0:012 0:026 0:031
Notes: Africa vs. Non-Africa refers to the null hypothesis that Africa weakly
dominates Non-Africa. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that
Non-Africa strictly dominates Africa. CMT = conservative maximal t statis-
tic, SMT = simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald = Wald statistic. Figures
in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at the
1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is
rejected at the 5% level; this is indicated by *.
We proceed with the test of whether the null hypothesis can be rejected between Latin America
and other country groups (the results are reported in Table 4.2). For Latin America vs. ROW,
the null can be rejected at FSD at 5% but cannot be rejected at SSD and TSD even at 5% for all
tests. When we reverse their position, we nd that the null cannot be rejected at any order even
at 5% for all tests. Taken together, both results imply that Latin America and ROW converge to
each other. For Latin America vs. OECD countries, the null can be rejected at any order at 1% for
all tests. Hence, we conclude that OECD countries dominate Latin America. We obtain similar
results for Latin America vs. Asia. That is, the null can be rejected at any order at 1% for all tests.
Hence, we conclude that Asia dominates Latin America.
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Table 4.2: Latin America vs. Non-Latin America
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:014 0:296 0:670 0:990 0:988 0:997
ROW SMT 0:016 0:086 0:195 0:879 0:583 0:605
Wald 0:011 0:084 0:187 0:857 0:550 0:542
CMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
OECD SMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000      
CMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Asia SMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Notes: Latin America vs. Non-Latin America refers to the null hypothesis that Latin Amer-
ica weakly dominates Non-Latin America. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude
that Non-Latin America strictly dominates Latin America. CMT = conservative maximal
t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald = Wald statistic. Figures in the
cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at the 1% level; this is in-
dicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected at the 5% level; this is
indicated by *.
Next, we test whether the null hypothesis can be rejected between Asia and other country
groups (see Table 4.3). For Asia vs. ROW, the null cannot be rejected at any order even at 5%
for all tests. When we reverse their position, we nd that the null can be rejected at any order at
1% for all tests. Collectively, both results indicate that Asia dominates ROW. For Asia vs. OECD
countries, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% for all tests. When we reverse their
position, we nd that the null can be rejected at FSD at 5% for all tests but cannot be rejected
at SSD and TSD at 5% for all tests. Both of these results show that Asia and OECD countries
converge to each other.
Finally, for OECD countries vs. ROW (see Table 4.4), we nd that the null cannot be rejected
at any order even at 5% for all tests. When we reverse their position, we nd that the null can be
rejected at any order at 1% for all tests. Hence, we conclude that OECD countries dominate ROW.
To recap, our interregional analysis produces the following ndings. First, convergence occurs
between a) Latin America and ROW, and b) Asia and OECD countries. Second, divergence occurs
between seven pairs of regions: a) Africa and ROW, b) Africa and OECD countries, c) Africa and
Asia, d) Latin America and OECD countries, e) Latin America and Asia, f) Asia and ROW, and g)
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OECD countries and ROW. Third, there is inconclusive evidence (of convergence or divergence)
for Africa and Latin America.
Table 4.3: Asia vs. Non-Asia
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
ROW SMT 1:000 1:000 0:997 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:904 0:788 0:698 0:000 0:000 0:000
CMT 0:652 0:765 0:776 0:036 0:502 0:908
OECD SMT 0:394 0:340 0:292 0:035 0:206 0:418
Wald 0:389 0:312 0:276 0:037 0:191 0:380
Notes: Asia vs. Non-Asia refers to the null hypothesis that Asia weakly dominates Non-
Asia. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that Non-Asia strictly dominates Asia.
CMT = conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald =
Wald statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected
at the 1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected at
the 5% level; this is indicated by *.
Table 4.4: OECD vs. ROW
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
ROW SMT 0:982 1:000 0:996 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:909 0:742 0:679 0:000 0:000 0:000
Notes: OECD vs. ROW refers to the null hypothesis that OECD weakly dominates ROW.
If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that ROW strictly dominates OECD. CMT =
conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald = Wald
statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at the
1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected at the
5% level; this is indicated by *.
4.4.1.2 Intertemporal Analysis
Instead of making interregional comparisons, we could make intertemporal comparisons
(i.e., we compare the same country group over two time periods). We test whether the growth
distribution of a given country group during the periods 1961-1980 and 1981-2000 diverge. The
test is implemented as follows:
H0 : bDs61 80 (z)  bDs81 20 (z)  0 vs: bDs61 80 (z)  bDs81 20 (z) > 0:
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The null says that 1961-1980 and 1981-2000 weakly diverge in the sense that 1961-1980 may
potentially dominate 1981-2000 and the alternative says that 1961-1980 and 1981-2000 strictly
diverge in the sense that the second period dominates the rst period. Therefore, if the null can be
rejected, then we conclude that 1981-2000 dominates 1961-1980. If the null cannot be rejected,
then we may reverse their position. Now if the null can be rejected, then we conclude that
1961-1980 dominates 1981-2000. If the null cannot be rejected, then we conclude that the region
under study converges over time.
For Africa, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% for all tests. When we reverse their
position, we nd that the null can be rejected at FSD at 5% for all tests but cannot be rejected
at SSD and TSD at 5% for all tests (see Table 4.5, which reports all results on intertemporal
analysis). Taken together, both results indicate that African countries have converged to each
other over time. For Latin America, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% for all tests.
When we reverse their position, we nd that the null can be rejected at any order at least at 5% for
all tests. Hence, the rst period dominates the second period. We take this result as evidence that
Latin American countries have diverged from each other over time.
For Asia, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% for all tests. When we reverse their
position, we obtain similar results (i.e., the null cannot be rejected at any order even at 5% for all
tests). We take these results as evidence that Asian countries have converged to each other over
time. For OECD countries, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% for all tests. When we
reverse their position, we nd that the null can be rejected at FSD at least at 5% for all tests but
cannot be rejected at SSD and TSD even at 5% for all tests. Taken together, both results imply
that OECD countries have converged to each other over time.
Finally, we test whether the null hypothesis can be rejected for a large sample of 100 countries.
We nd that the null cannot be rejected at any order even at 5%. When we reverse their position,
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we nd similar results (i.e., the null cannot be rejected at any order even at 5% for all tests).
Hence, the world has converged over time.
Table 4.5: 1961-1980 vs. 1981-2000
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:996 0:773 0:524 0:028 0:482 0:642
Africa SMT 0:895 0:322 0:155 0:025 0:186 0:203
Wald 0:868 0:296 0:148 0:036 0:165 0:191
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:009 0:006 0:020
Latin SMT 0:995 0:987 0:933 0:007 0:004 0:003
Wald 0:879 0:722 0:623 0:003 0:004 0:005
CMT 0:871 0:932 0:870 0:736 1:000 1:000
Asia SMT 0:608 0:441 0:348 0:467 0:754 0:840
Wald 0:568 0:400 0:312 0:480 0:717 0:651
CMT 0:996 0:917 0:851 0:010 0:486 0:745
OECD SMT 0:897 0:434 0:319 0:008 0:182 0:235
Wald 0:875 0:408 0:292 0:014 0:166 0:225
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:084 0:183 0:220
World SMT 0:990 0:880 0:752 0:063 0:057 0:065
Wald 0:869 0:709 0:635 0:061 0:054 0:056
Notes: 1961-1980 vs. 1981-2000 refers to the null hypothesis that 1961-1980 weakly
dominates 1981-2000. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that 1981-2000 strictly
dominates 1961-1980. CMT = conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal
t statistic, and Wald = Wald statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01,
then the null is rejected at the 1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05,
then the null is rejected at the 5% level; this is indicated by *.
In summary, our intertemporal analysis yields two main results. First, intraregional convergence
occurs for Africa, Asia, OECD countries, and the world. Second, intraregional divergence occurs
for Latin America only.
4.4.2 Robustness Analysis
Hitherto, our convergence dominance analysis has been based on actual growth rates of per
capita GDP. Since no attempt is made to control for structural features of the economies (in the
spirit of conditional convergence), our ndings can merely be construed in terms of absolute
versus club convergence. If this deciency can be overcome, then our results can be interpreted in
terms of conditional versus club convergence. MRS (2006) overcome this deciency by utilizing
residual (instead of actual) growth rates. Their method can be summarized as follows. First,
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they run a linear parametric regression in the manner of MRW (1992). Second, they employ a
specication test developed by Hsiao, Li, and Racine (2006) to determine whether this linear
specication is rejected. If the model is not rejected, then they take residuals from this regression
and conduct a stochastic dominance analysis. If the model is rejected, then they proceed with a
nonparametric regression, take residuals from this regression, and conduct a stochastic dominance
analysis.
Following their footsteps, we run a MRW regression for a large sample of countries. Due
to data constraints, we end up with 76 countries with the following regional decompositions:
Africa (16 countries), Latin America (21 countries), Asia (18 countries), and OECD countries
(22 countries). To enable us to conduct interregional and intertemporal stochastic dominance
analyses, we divide the sample according to three periods of analysis: 1960-2000, 1961-1980,
and 1981-2000. The MRW specication based on the 76-country sample is rejected by the
Hsiao-Li-Racine test for the periods 1960-2000 and 1961-1980, but not for the period 1981-2000.
Therefore, for the periods 1960-2000 and 1961-1980, we proceed by running a nonparametric
regression model and extracting its residual growth rates. For the period 1981-2000, we obtain
residual growth rates from the MRW regression.29 As before, these residuals have been adjusted
to be nonnegative.
4.4.2.1 Interregional Analysis
Using these residual growth rates, we begin by testing whether the null hypothesis can be
rejected between Africa and other country groups. For Africa vs. ROW, the null cannot be
rejected at any order at 5% for all tests. When we reverse their position, we obtain similar results:
the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% (see Table 4.6). Taken together, these results imply
that Africa converges to ROW. Note that these results contradict our baseline results (results
29 I am grateful to Dr. Jeff Racine for providing me with the data on residual growth rates from parametric and
nonparametric regressions.
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obtained based on actual growth rates), where we conclude that ROW dominates Africa. We take
these results as evidence in favor of the conditional convergence hypothesis (and against the club
convergence hypothesis).
Table 4.6: Africa vs. Non-Africa
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:615 0:941 0:916 0:950 1:000 1:000
ROW SMT 0:382 0:408 0:301 0:713 0:784 0:815
Wald 0:368 0:370 0:291 0:702 0:659 0:572
CMT 0:781 0:698 0:744 0:976 1:000 1:000
OECD SMT 0:506 0:231 0:173 0:797 0:852 0:899
Wald 0:478 0:218 0:179 0:778 0:678 0:569
CMT 0:696 0:890 0:896 0:953 1:000 1:000
Asia SMT 0:433 0:359 0:293 0:720 0:828 0:851
Wald 0:327 0:330 0:273 0:719 0:683 0:591
CMT 0:369 0:809 0:789 0:825 0:976 0:999
Latin SMT 0:219 0:331 0:238 0:548 0:535 0:636
Wald 0:253 0:296 0:232 0:559 0:511 0:576
Notes: Africa vs. Non-Africa refers to the null hypothesis that Africa weakly dom-
inates Non-Africa. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that Non-Africa
strictly dominates Africa. CMT = conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated
maximal t statistic, and Wald = Wald statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If
p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at the 1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01
< p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected at the 5% level; this is indicated by *.
We repeat the analysis for Africa vs. OECD countries. For all tests, the null cannot be rejected
at any order at 5%. Since we obtain similar results when we reverse their position (see Table
4.6), we conclude that Africa converges to OECD countries (note that these results stand in stark
contrast to those in our baseline analysis). As before, we take these results as evidence in support
of the conditional convergence hypothesis.
When we conduct the analysis for Africa vs. Asia (for original and reversed positions), we
obtain results which imply that Africa converges to Asia (see Table 4.6). We interpret these
ndings as evidence in favor of conditional convergence. Finally, we conduct the analysis for
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Africa vs. Latin America (again for original and reversed positions). We obtain results which
suggest that Africa converges to Latin America (see Table 4.6). These results are taken as evidence
in support of conditional convergence.
We proceed with the test of whether the null hypothesis can be rejected between Latin America
and other country groups. For Latin America vs. ROW, the null cannot be rejected at any order
at 5% for all tests. Since these results continue to hold when their position is reversed (see Table
4.7), they suggest that Latin America converges to ROW (note that these results concur with those
we obtain in the baseline analysis). We construe these results as evidence that lends support to the
conditional convergence hypothesis.
Table 4.7: Latin America vs. Non-Latin America
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:150 0:482 0:741 0:618 1:000 1:000
ROW SMT 0:097 0:150 0:203 0:352 0:810 0:816
Wald 0:106 0:129 0:191 0:366 0:661 0:595
CMT 0:116 0:093 0:182 0:454 1:000 1:000
OECD SMT 0:080 0:029 0:040 0:279 0:875 0:943
Wald 0:085 0:025 0:036 0:213 0:673 0:592
CMT 0:425 0:488 0:498 0:822 1:000 1:000
Asia SMT 0:257 0:192 0:142 0:549 0:918 0:919
Wald 0:200 0:157 0:130 0:557 0:736 0:646
Notes: Latin America vs. Non-Latin America refers to the null hypothesis that Latin
America weakly dominates Non-Latin America. If the null can be rejected, then we
conclude that Non-Latin America strictly dominates Latin America. CMT = conser-
vative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald = Wald
statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at
the 1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected
at the 5% level; this is indicated by *.
For Latin America vs. OECD countries, the null cannot be rejected at any order for CMT test.
When we employ SMT and Wald tests, however, the null cannot be rejected at FSD at 5% but can
be rejected at SSD and TSD at 5%. These results are anomalous given the fact that lower-order
dominance implies higher-order dominance but not the other way around (see Table 4.7). The
anomaly of these results precludes us from drawing any denitive conclusion from this exercise.
At best, the evidence is inconclusive.
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Next, we repeat the analysis for Latin America vs. Asia. For all tests, the null cannot be
rejected at any order at 5%. Similar results are obtained when their position is reversed (see
Table 4.7). Since these results imply that Latin America converges to Asia (note that these results
differ from those obtained in the baseline analysis), they are construed as evidence in support of
conditional convergence.
Now we test whether the null hypothesis can be rejected between Asia and other country
groups. For Asia vs. ROW, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5%, and similar results
are obtained when their position is reversed (see Table 4.8). Since these results suggest that Asia
converges to ROW (and they contradict our baseline results), they are taken as evidence in favor
of club convergence.
Table 4.8: Asia vs. Non-Asia
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:986 1:000 1:000 0:641 0:881 0:921
ROW SMT 0:838 0:846 0:851 0:399 0:364 0:357
Wald 0:826 0:703 0:616 0:348 0:340 0:309
CMT 0:985 0:740 0:772 0:640 0:972 0:999
OECD SMT 0:833 0:286 0:229 0:391 0:522 0:674
Wald 0:813 0:258 0:229 0:391 0:493 0:606
Notes: Asia vs. Non-Asia refers to the null hypothesis that Asia weakly dominates
Non-Asia. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that Non-Asia strictly dom-
inates Asia. CMT = conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t
statistic, and Wald = Wald statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value <
0.01, then the null is rejected at the 1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value
< 0.05, then the null is rejected at the 5% level; this is indicated by *.
For Asia vs. OECD countries, we obtain results similar to those obtained between Asia vs.
ROW: the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% in the original position, and similar results
are obtained when their position is reversed (see Table 4.8). These results, which agree with our
baseline results, imply that Asia converges to OECD countries. We take these results as evidence
in favor of conditional convergence.
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Finally, we test whether the null hypothesis can be rejected between OECD countries and
ROW. As shown in Table 4.9, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% for all tests. When we
reverse their position, the results are not so clear-cut. For CMT test, the null can be rejected at
FSD and SSD at 5% test but cannot be rejected at TSD at 5%. For SMT and Wald tests, the null
can be rejected at all orders at 5%. We take these mixed results as inconclusive evidence in favor
of conditional convergence.
Table 4.9: OECD vs. ROW
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:578 1:000 1:000 0:019 0:046 0:091
ROW SMT 0:390 0:812 0:921 0:017 0:016 0:027
Wald 0:415 0:708 0:633 0:028 0:016 0:024
Notes: OECD vs. ROW refers to the null hypothesis that OECD weakly dominates ROW.
If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that ROW strictly dominates OECD. CMT =
conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald = Wald
statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at the
1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected at the
5% level; this is indicated by *.
One may argue that the contradicting results between baseline and robustness analyses might
be due to the difference in sample size (100-country vs. 76-country sample). To accommodate
this objection, we repeat our baseline analysis with this reduced 76-country sample. It turns out
that our baseline results are broadly robust to the difference in sample size (see Tables F1F5
in Appendix F). That is, the baseline results are similar except for a) Africa vs. Latin America
(where there is evidence of convergence between them) and b) Latin America vs. ROW (where
there is inconclusive evidence of convergence or divergence). Therefore, we conclude that these
contradicting results are due to whether or not structural features of the economies are held
constant. Once these structural features are accounted for, evidence of interregional divergence
disappears in most cases considered. We take all of these ndings as overwhelming evidence in
favor of conditional convergence.
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4.4.2.2 Intertemporal Analysis
As before, we proceed by making intertemporal comparisons of each country group and report
their results in Table 4.10. For Africa, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% for all tests.
When we reverse their position, we obtain similar results for CMT test. For SMT and Wald tests,
however, the null can be rejected at FSD at 5% but cannot be rejected at SSD and TSD at 5% (note
that these results accord with our baseline results). Therefore, we conclude that African countries
are converging to each other over time. We take these results as evidence in favor of conditional
convergence.
Table 4.10: 1961-1980 vs. 1981-2000
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:996 0:936 0:830 0:051 0:400 0:652
Africa SMT 0:894 0:443 0:308 0:045 0:131 0:196
Wald 0:870 0:416 0:276 0:038 0:123 0:183
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:045 0:079 0:110
Latin SMT 0:976 0:942 0:921 0:043 0:025 0:030
Wald 0:877 0:716 0:634 0:009 0:027 0:029
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:020 0:014 0:043
Asia SMT 0:983 0:996 0:975 0:018 0:007 0:011
Wald 0:881 0:716 0:622 0:013 0:007 0:011
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
OECD SMT 1:000 0:994 0:935 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:909 0:703 0:612 0:000 0:000 0:000
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
World SMT 0:993 0:988 0:971 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:879 0:703 0:622 0:000 0:000 0:000
Notes: 1961-1980 vs. 1981-2000 refers to the null hypothesis that 1961-1980 weakly
dominates 1981-2000. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that 1981-2000 strictly
dominates 1961-1980. CMT = conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal
t statistic, and Wald = Wald statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01,
then the null is rejected at the 1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05,
then the null is rejected at the 5% level; this is indicated by *.
For Latin America, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% for all tests. When we reverse
their position, we nd the following. For SMT and Wald tests, the null can be rejected at all orders
at 5%. For CMT test, however, the null can be rejected at FSD at 5% but cannot be rejected at
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SSD and TSD at 5%. We take these mixed ndings (which contradict our baseline ndings) as
inconclusive evidence in favor of conditional convergence.
For Asia, the null cannot be rejected at any order at 5% for all tests. When we reverse their
position, the null can be rejected at all orders at least at 5% for all tests. These ndings, which
contradict our baseline ndings, suggest that Asian countries are diverging from each other over
time. We take these ndings as evidence in favor of club convergence.
For OECD countries, the null cannot be rejected at any order for all tests. When we reverse
their position, the null can be rejected at all orders at 1% for all tests. As in the case of Asia, these
ndings imply that OECD countries are diverging from each other, thereby providing support for
club convergence.
Finally, we conduct the analysis for the world. We obtain results similar to those found in the
OECD countries (i.e., the null cannot be rejected in the original position but can be rejected in
the reversed position). As in the OECD case, these results suggest that countries in the world are
diverging from each other. In this case, too, there is support for club convergence.
As before, the contradicting results between these baseline and robustness analyses can be
attributed to the difference in sample size. To conrm whether or not this is the case, we repeat
our baseline analysis with the 76-country sample. It turns out that the baseline results are sensitive
to the sample size difference for the case of a) OECD countries and b) the world. That is, there is
evidence of divergence in each case (see Table F5 in Appendix F).
The purpose of this exercise is to show that, once we control for the difference in sample
size, any remaining differences can be conveniently accounted for by the structural features of
the economies. Holding these structural features constant, evidence of intraregional convergence
vanishes in the case of Asia, OECD countries, and the world. We take these results as evidence
in favor of club convergence. For Africa, however, evidence of intraregional convergence
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remains intact. We interpret this result as evidence that Africa is converging to a low steady-state
equilibrium.
4.5 Discussion
As mentioned earlier, the convergence literature distinguishes between absolute, conditional,
and club convergence. Absolute convergence refers to the tendency for countries to converge to a
single steady state without conditioning on any control variables. Conditional convergence refers
to the tendency for countries to converge to a single steady state conditional on the structural
features of the economies. Club convergence refers to the tendency for countries to converge to
different steady states even when the structural features of the economies are controlled for.
In the stochastic dominance context, using actual growth rates mimics the notion of absolute
convergence whereas using residual growth rates mimics the idea of conditional convergence.
Since there exists no method for studying club convergence within the framework of stochastic
dominance, we coarsely partition our large sample of countries (100 or 76) into four regional
groups: Africa, Latin America, Asia, and OECD countries. In the baseline analysis, we analyze
convergence among countries based on actual growth rates. Since this analysis does not control
for structural features of the economies, our ndings can merely be construed in terms of absolute
versus club convergence. In the robustness analysis, we repeat the analysis using residual growth
rates. In this latter analysis, our ndings can be construed in terms of conditional versus club
convergence.
Our analysis in the preceding section has produced a number of intriguing ndings. In
interregional analysis, we nd that most regions converge to each other in a pairwise comparison
(after controlling for structural features of the economies). We take these ndings as evidence in
favor of conditional convergence. In intertemporal analysis, we obtain the following results (again,
after controlling for structural features of the economies). First, African countries are converging
to each other. Second, Asian countries are diverging from each other. Third, OECD countries are
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diverging from each other. Finally, countries in the world are diverging from each other. Except
for Africa, these intertemporal ndings suggest that there is an intraregional divergence among
countries. We take these results as evidence in favor of club convergence. For Africa, however, it
seems that the continent as a whole is converging to a low steady-state equilibrium.
It seems that there is conicting evidence from interregional and intertemporal analyes: in
the former, countries appear to exhibit conditional convergence; in the latter, countries appear to
exhibit club convergence. How do we reconcile these seemingly paradoxical ndings? It turns out
that there is a simple, plausible explanation for them: taken together, both ndings suggest that
there is an intraregional (but not interregional) mobility among countries. We take these results as
evidence in support of the club convergence hypothesis, which in turn, is evidence in support of
the phenomenon of multiple regimes among countries.
Now we compare our ndings with the previous ndings in the convergence literature. Since
the contribution of Baumol (1986), regression-based convergence studies have undergone three
stages of renements. First, De Long (1988) improves on Baumol's analysis by choosing
countries that appear to converge as of the initial period of analysis. He nds no evidence of
absolute convergence among countries. Second, MRW (1992) rene De Long's study by including
control variables as implied by the Solow model. They nd evidence of conditional convergence
among countries. Third, Durlauf and Johnson (1995) improve on MRW's method by partitioning
countries into multiple regimes as implied by the Azariadis-Drazen model. They nd evidence of
club convergence among countries. Subsequent work proves that evidence of club convergence is
broadly robust across a host of different methods and specications; see DJT (2005). Accordingly,
the notion of club convergence is almost universally taken as a norm in the convergence literature.
Despite the overwhelming evidence on club convergence, regression-based convergence
studies share one common aw: the convergence coefcient merely captures the conditional
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mean of the growth rates. In contrast, a stochastic dominance approach to convergence analysis
examines the entire growth distribution. Anderson (2004a), who pioneers the work in this area,
conducts a convergence dominance analysis for a large sample of countries over multiple time
periods: 1970-1990, 1971-1991,. . . , 1975-1995. In most cases considered, he nds evidence of
convergence (see Table 2 in his paper). Since his analysis is conned to the entire world only,
and no attempt is made to control for steady-state determinants, it is not possible to interpret his
results beyond absolute convergence.
MRS (2006) take the analysis one step forward by breaking the world into OECD countries
and ROW and analyzing whether convergence occurs a) between OECD countries and ROW, b)
within OECD countries over two time periods, and c) within ROW over two time periods. For all
the three cases considered, they nd no evidence of absolute convergence but there is evidence in
favor of conditional convergence. Taken together, their results can be taken as evidence against
club convergence. However, since their analysis is limited to two regions of the world only, the
data may not be able to uncover the true growth behavior of countries. In our analysis, where the
world is broken up into four country groups, evidence in favor of club convergence is restored.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we revisit the convergence hypothesis by using a stochastic dominance method
developed by Davidson and Duclos (2000). An advantage of this method over the conventional
regression-based models is that the convergence behavior of countries is examined using the entire
growth distribution as opposed to the conditional mean of the growth rates. Therefore, the results
are more informative.
Our ndings can be decomposed into interregional and intertemporal analyses. For
interregional analysis, we nd that most regions converge to each other in a pairwise comparison.
Since these ndings control for structural features of the economies, we take these ndings as
evidence in favor of conditional convergence. For intertemporal analysis, we obtain the following.
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First, African countries are converging to each other. Second, Asian countries are diverging from
each other. Third, OECD countries are diverging from each other. Finally, countries in the world
are diverging from each other. Except for Africa, these intertemporal ndings suggest that there
is an intraregional divergence among countries. We take these results as evidence in favor of club
convergence. For Africa, however, it seems that the continent as a whole is converging to a low
steady-state equilibrium. Coupled with interregional ndings, these intertemporal ndings suggest
that, once structural features are held constant, there is an intraregional (but not interregional)
mobility among countries. We take these results as evidence in support of the club convergence
hypothesis, which in turn, is evidence in support of the phenomenon of multiple regimes among
countries.
While our convergence results are based on the entire growth distribution, they are not without
drawbacks. For one thing, our results are based on an exogenous partitioning of countries; it is




This dissertation is motivated by the need to ascertain whether the world economy, conditional
on the structural features of the economies, is characterized by a single or multiple regimes. If
the world is characterized by a single regime, then economic policies need to be directed toward
structural features (technologies, saving rates, population growth rates, etc.). If the world is
characterized by multiple regimes, then economic policies need to be directed toward initial
conditions (initial stock of human capital, initial distribution of income, etc.). There are two ways
to address this issue. The rst approach is to conduct a direct test on multiple-regime models; this
approach is adopted in Chapters 2 and 3. The second approach is to build upon the work of the
convergence hypothesis; this approach is employed in Chapter 4.
To begin with, today we have observed a growing number of multiple-regime models. Of
these, the model developed by Galor and Zeira (1993) is particularly inuential because it shows
the linkage between income inequality and economic growth. However, except for Perotti (1996)
who tests this model in passing, this model has not been comprehensively tested.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation is devoted to the empirical analysis of this model. Our baseline
estimation based on a sample of 46 countries during the period 1970-2000 produces results that
lend support to the model. These results are broadly robust to different model specications,
different samples, and alternative control variables. We take these results as evidence in favor of
the Galor-Zeira model. Since the model belongs to the family of multiple-regime models, our
results can be further interpreted as support for the multiple-regime models.
In recent years, we have observed a growing number of models which attempt to explain the
link between income inequality and economic growth. In the Galor-Zeira model, this link is
made possible by the existence of imperfect credit markets. In other models, the link is provided
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by endogenous fertility decisions. One model in this class, due to Kremer and Chen (2002), is
particularly interesting because it belongs to the family of multiple-regime models.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the empirical investigation of this model. Our baseline estimation,
using a number of alternative proxies for human capital differential variable, delivers results
that are consistent with the predictions. These results are also broadly robust to different model
specications, different samples, and alternative control variables. We take these results as
evidence in favor of the Kremer-Chen model. As in Chapter 2, since this model belongs to
the family of multiple-regime models, our results can be further construed as support for the
multiple-regime models.
As stated earlier, another way to address the single-versus-multiple-regime issue is by testing
the convergence hypothesis. A conventional approach to study convergence is by using a growth
regression model. However, as DJT (2005) put it, the regression-based models on which the
analysis is based are questionable. In brief, evidence of convergence is obtained from the
coefcient of initial income in a regression model where the growth rate of per capita income is
the dependent variable and structural variables (plus initial income) are the explanatory variables.
A major drawback of this approach is that evidence of convergence is inferred from the conditional
mean of the growth rate. A better way is to infer the evidence of convergence from the entire
distribution of the growth rate.
This is the approach taken by the stochastic dominance analysis that we employ in Chapter 4.
Our baseline analysis based on a sample of 100 countries yields results that are consistent with
the conditional convergence hypothesis. In a more careful robustness analysis (controlling for
structural features of the economies), however, we obtain results that are consistent with the club
convergence hypothesis. We take these results as evidence in favor of the multiple-regime models.
111
What do we learn from all of these results? Since all of them provide support for the
multiple-regime models, we conclude that initial conditions matter in the growth process. The
policy implication that emerges from this conclusion is that there is a need to alter the level of
these initial conditions in order for countries to converge to high-income groups. In two of the
models studied here (the Galor-Zeira and Kremer-Chen models), the initial condition is essentially
the initial distribution of income. If the initial income distribution is relatively equal (unequal),
then a particular economy will converge to a high-income (low-income) equilibrium. If we take
these models seriously, then an appropriate course of action to be taken is to provide easier access
to education for the poor people so that they might be able to escape from the poverty trap.
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Appendix A: Algebra of the Galor-Zeira Model
In this appendix, we derive Eq.(2.5). To maximize utility in Eq.(2.1) with respect to b subject
to the budget constraint in Eq.(2.2), we begin by substituting (2.2) into (2.1):
V =  log [(x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu   b] + (1  ) log b: (A1)
Differentiating (A1) with respect to b, we obtain the optimal bequest for individuals who
choose not to invest in education:
bu(x) = (1  ) [(x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu] : (A2)
Substituting (A2) back into (A1) and rearranging, we obtain the optimal utility:
Vu(x) = log [(x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu] + "; (A3)
where " =  log+ (1  ) log(1  ):
To maximize utility (2.1) with respect to b subject to the budget constraint (2.3), we begin by
substituting (2.3) into (2.1):
V =  log [(x  h) (1 + i) + ws   b] + (1  ) log b: (A4)
Differentiating (A4) with respect to b, we obtain the optimal bequest for individuals whose
x < h but choose to invest in education:
bs(x) = (1  ) [(x  h) (1 + i) + ws] : (A5)
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Substituting (A5) back into (A4) and rearranging, we obtain the optimal utility:
Vs(x) = log [(x  h) (1 + i) + ws] + ": (A6)
To maximize utility (2.1) with respect to b subject to the budget constraint (2.4), we begin by
substituting (2.4) into (2.1):
V =  log [(x  h) (1 + r) + ws   b] + (1  ) log b: (A7)
Differentiating (A7) with respect to b, we obtain the optimal bequest for individuals whose
x  h and choose to invest in education:
bs(x) = (1  ) [(x  h) (1 + r) + ws] : (A8)
Substituting (A8) back into (A7) and rearranging, we obtain the optimal utility:
Vs(x) = log [(x  h) (1 + r) + ws] + ": (A9)
Regardless of the amount of inheritance, the decision to invest in education depends on the
relative size of relevant utilities. For individuals whose x < h, this decision depends on the
relative size of (A3) and (A6). Equating (A3) with (A6), we obtain
f =
wu(2 + r) + h(1 + i)  ws
i  r ; (A10)
where f is the amount of inheritance in which individuals are indifferent in their decision
of whether or not to invest in education. Thus, individuals whose a) f  x < h will invest in
education, and b) x < f will not invest in education.
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For individuals whose x  h, the decision to invest in education depends on the relative size of
(A3) and (A9). We assume that the wage income of skilled workers net of educational investment
is at least as great as the wage income of unskilled workers amounts. This amounts to stipulating
that (A9) is at least as great as (A3), which implies
ws   h(1 + r)  wu(2 + r): (A11)
Therefore, these individuals will always invest in education.
Given (A1) through (A11), the dynamics of the model can be expressed by Eq.(2.5) in the text:
xt+1 = (1  )
8<: [(xt + wu)(1 + r) + wu] if xt < f[(xt   h)(1 + i) + ws] if f  xt < h
[(xt   h)(1 + r) + ws] if xt > h
9=; :
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Appendix B: Additional Results for the Galor-Zeira Model
Table B1: Estimation of 1980-2000 Sample with 46 Obs.
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ







































Latin      0:287
( 1:38)
 
Asia      0:256
( 1:08)
 
Adj.R2 0:77 0:65 0:79 0:64
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B2: Baseline Estimation with Ginilev
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ







































Latin      0:477
( 2:03)
  
Asia      0:238
( 0:94)
 
Adj.R2 0:67 0:69 0:72 0:67
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B3: Baseline Estimation with Wage Premium
Dep.Variable Inc2000 Educ Inc2000 Educ





































Africa     1:019
(1:23)
 
Latin      0:402
( 0:92)
 
Asia      0:230
( 0:58)
 
Adj.R2 0:58 0:56 0:60 0:53
Obs. 33 33 33 33
Notes: Except for dummies and Premium, all variables are expressed in logs.
Estimation is done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the
second- and rst-stage regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in paren-
theses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table B4: Reduced-Form Estimation


















































Adj.R2 0:69 0:70 0:43
Obs. 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by OLS. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix C: Algebra of the Kremer-Chen Model
a) The Derivation of the Inverse Relationship between ws=wu and R
Let the aggregate production function for the economy be given by Y = AL1=2s L1=2u , where Y
is the level of output, A is the level of technology, Ls is the stock of skilled labor, and Lu is the
stock of unskilled labor. (The use of 1=2 in the exponents of Ls and Lu is to simplify algebra.)
Assuming that labor markets are competitive, then
ws = (1=2)A (Lu=Ls)
1=2 = (1=2)AR 1=2; and
wu = (1=2)A (Ls=Lu)
1=2 = (1=2)AR1=2:











b) The Derivation of the Inverse Relationship between n and w
Let each household faces the following utility function: V = ln (n) + x, where V is utility, n
is the number of children, and x is the amount of consumption. Let the total time endowment for
each household be 1 and the total time needed to raise each child be a fraction ' of the total time
endowment. Then, the household's budget constraint is x = (1  'n)w. Then, the rst-order






c) The Derivation of Eq.(3.7)
For convenience, let us reproduce Eq.(3.5):
t   if Rt+1 = 1  cL
t =  if Rt+1 2 (1  cH ; 1  cL)
t   if Rt+1 = 1  cH
Based on Eq.(3.5), we state the following propositions.
Proposition 1 If R  1  cH ; then Rt+1 = 1  cH .
Proof. Suppose that Rt+1 > 1   cH . Then, Eq.(3.5) implies that t =  and R > 1   cH . But
this is a contradiction. Now suppose that Rt+1 < 1   cH . Then, every individual will invest in
education.
Proposition 2 If R  1  cL; then Rt+1 = 1  cL.
Proof. Suppose that Rt+1 < 1   cL. Then, Eq.(3.5) implies that t =  and R < 1   cL. But
this is a contradiction. Now suppose that Rt+1 > 1  cL. Then, every individual will not invest in
education.
Proposition 3 If R 2 (1  cH ; 1  cL) ; then Rt+1 = (R2t + ) = (1  ).
Proof. Suppose that Rt+1 = 1  cH . Then, Eq.(3.5) implies that t   and Rt+1  R > 1  cH .
But this is a contradiction. Now suppose that Rt+1 = 1   cL. Then, Eq.(3.5) implies that t  
and Rt+1  R < 1  cL. But this is a contradiction too.
Combining all of these propositions yields the evolution of Rt as in Eq.(3.7):
Rt+1 =
8<: 1  cL if R  1  cLR if R 2 (1  cH ; 1  cL)1  cH if R  1  cH
9=;
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Appendix D: Additional Results for the Kremer-Chen Model
Table D1: Baseline Estimation with Ls0=Lu0
Dep. Variable Inc2000 Ls0=Lu0 Inc2000 Ls0=Lu0








































Latin      0:231
( 0:91)
 
Asia     0:079
(0:27)
 
Adj. R2 0:60 0:50 0:62 0:50
Obs. 43 43 43 43
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table D2: Baseline Estimation with Ls1=Lu1
Dep. Variable Inc2000 Ls1=Lu1 Inc2000 Ls1=Lu1








































Latin      0:158
( 0:68)
 
Asia     0:105
(0:39)
 
Adj. R2 0:69 0:60 0:70 0:60
Obs. 43 43 43 43
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table D3: Baseline Estimation with Ls2=Lu2
Dep. Variable Inc2000 Ls2=Lu2 Inc2000 Ls2=Lu2







































Latin      0:235
( 1:07)
 
Asia      0:270
( 1:12)
 
Adj. R2 0:70 0:56 0:72 0:57
Obs. 43 43 43 43
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table D4: Baseline Estimation with Ls3=Lu3
Dep. Variable Inc2000 Ls3=Lu3 Inc2000 Ls3=Lu3







































Latin      0:371
( 1:86)
  
Asia      0:417
( 1:91)
  
Adj. R2 0:71 0:57 0:76 0:62
Obs. 43 43 43 43
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table D5: Baseline Estimation with Ls4=Lu4
Dep. Variable Inc2000 Ls4=Lu4 Inc2000 Ls4=Lu4







































Latin      0:105
( 0:46)
 
Asia      0:212
( 0:87)
 
Adj. R2 0:71 0:66 0:71 0:66
Obs. 43 43 43 43
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table D6: Panel Data Estimation with Unweighted Ls1=Lu1
Dependent Income Ls1=Lu1 Income Ls1=Lu1 Ls1=Lu1 Income Ls1=Lu1


















































     1:159
(3:73)
  












Asia      0:420
( 1:89)
      0:507
( 0:95)
 
Adj. R2 0:56 0:44 0:70 0:44 0:39 0:77 0:56
Obs. 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b)
report results from the second- and rst-stage regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table D7: Baseline Estimation with Ginilev
Dep. Variable Inc2000 Ls1=Lu1 Inc2000 Ls1=Lu1








































Latin      0:137
( 0:62)
 
Asia     0:097
(0:40)
 
Adj. R2 0:70 0:64 0:71 0:65
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by 2SLS; columns (a) and (b) report results from the second- and rst-stage
regressions, respectively. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table D8: Reduced-Form Estimation




















































Adj. R2 0:74 0:74 0:43
Obs. 46 46 46
Notes: Except for dummies, all variables are expressed in logs. Estimation is
done by OLS. t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix E: Calculation of the Weighted Ls1=Lu1 Data
For a given skill category indexed by i (i = 0; 1; :::; 5), skilled and unskilled workers, Lsi and
Lui, are weighted by a function of the return to education, , times the duration of education,
 . Data on the return to education by country i, i, is taken from Bils and Klenow (2000), who
estimate the Mincerian wage regression. Data on the duration of education at various levels j by
country i,  ij , is taken directly from Jong-Wha Lee; this data set is unpublished. The levels of
education are no education (no), some primary (sp), complete primary (cp), some secondary (ss),
complete secondary (cs), some teritary (st), and complete tertiary education (ct). Lee furnishes
the data on the duration of education for cp, ss, and cs only. We assume that the duration of ct is 4
years, st is one-half of ct, and sp is one-half of cp.
Given the data and these plausible assumptions, the weighted Ls1 and Lu1 data for country i
are constructed as follows,
Li;s1 = Li;st + exp (i i;ct)Li;ct; and
Li;u1 = Li;no + exp (i i;sp)Li;sp + exp (i i;cp)Li;cp
+exp (i i;ss)Li;ss + exp (i i;cs)Li;cs:
Note that the exponential terms attached to workers with higher education levels ensure that
more educated workers are weighted more heavily than less educated workers. In this manner,
the aggregation problem is alleviated. Note also that, if we assume that all exponential terms are
equal to unity, we will recover the unweighted data.
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Appendix F: Additional Results for the Convergence Hypothesis
Table F1: Africa vs. Non-Africa
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
ROW SMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000      
CMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
OECD SMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000      
CMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Asia SMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000      
CMT 0:369 0:301 0:367 1:000 1:000 1:000
Latin SMT 0:220 0:098 0:106 0:982 0:912 0:916
Wald 0:135 0:097 0:091 0:878 0:728 0:642
Notes: Africa vs. Non-Africa refers to the null hypothesis that Africa weakly dominates Non-
Africa. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that Non-Africa strictly dominates Africa.
CMT = conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald =
Wald statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at
the 1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected at the
5% level; this is indicated by *.
Table F2: Latin America vs. Non-Latin America
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:009 0:033 0:140 0:997 1:000 1:000
ROW SMT 0:008 0:012 0:036      
Wald 0:003 0:012 0:033      
CMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
OECD SMT 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000      
CMT 0:003 0:000 0:000      
Asia SMT 0:002 0:000 0:000      
Wald 0:000 0:000 0:000      
Notes: Latin America vs. Non-Latin America refers to the null hypothesis that Latin America
weakly dominates Non-Latin America. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that Non-
Latin America strictly dominates Latin America. CMT = conservative maximal t statistic, SMT
= simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald = Wald statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values.
If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at the 1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 <
p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected at the 5% level; this is indicated by *.
136
Table F3: Asia vs. Non-Asia
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
ROW SMT 1:000 1:000 0:997 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:895 0:774 0:681 0:000 0:000 0:000
CMT 0:640 0:744 0:757 0:099 0:449 0:871
OECD SMT 0:385 0:324 0:281 0:068 0:181 0:390
Wald 0:376 0:298 0:259 0:063 0:166 0:341
Notes: Asia vs. Non-Asia refers to the null hypothesis that Asia weakly dominates Non-Asia.
If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that Non-Asia strictly dominates Asia. CMT
= conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald = Wald
statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at the 1%
level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected at the 5% level;
this is indicated by *.
Table F4: OECD vs. ROW
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:979 1:000 1:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
ROW SMT 0:853 1:000 0:993 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:841 0:734 0:657 0:000 0:000 0:000
Notes: OECD vs. ROW refers to the null hypothesis that OECD weakly dominates ROW. If
the null can be rejected, then we conclude that ROW strictly dominates OECD. CMT = con-
servative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t statistic, and Wald = Wald statistic.
Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null is rejected at the 1% level;
this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is rejected at the 5% level; this is
indicated by *.
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Table F5: 1961-1980 vs. 1981-2000
Original Position Reversed Position
Region Test FSD SSD TSD FSD SSD TSD
CMT 0:996 1:000 1:000 0:020 0:329 0:515
Africa SMT 0:895 0:825 0:845 0:016 0:119 0:161
Wald 0:872 0:744 0:689 0:024 0:111 0:151
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Latin SMT 1:000 0:986 0:936 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:905 0:732 0:450 0:000 0:000 0:000
CMT 0:968 1:000 1:000 0:359 0:677 0:875
Asia SMT 0:759 0:772 0:779 0:221 0:273 0:353
Wald 0:753 0:728 0:645 0:208 0:241 0:314
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
OECD SMT 0:996 0:819 0:822 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:898 0:751 0:657 0:000 0:000 0:000
CMT 1:000 1:000 1:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
World SMT 1:000 0:968 0:943 0:000 0:000 0:000
Wald 0:897 0:732 0:644 0:000 0:000 0:000
Notes: 1961-1980 vs. 1981-2000 refers to the null hypothesis that 1961-1980 weakly domi-
nates 1981-2000. If the null can be rejected, then we conclude that 1981-2000 strictly domi-
nates 1961-1980. CMT = conservative maximal t statistic, SMT = simulated maximal t statis-
tic, and Wald = Wald statistic. Figures in the cells are p-values. If p-value < 0.01, then the null
is rejected at the 1% level; this is indicated by **. If 0.01 < p-value < 0.05, then the null is
rejected at the 5% level; this is indicated by *.
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